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2761 
TRUST PROTECTORS, AGENCY COSTS, AND 
FIDUCIARY DUTY 
Stewart E. Sterk* 
In recent years, fiduciary duty scholarship has focused on the 
agency cost problems that afflict private trusts.1  Robert Sitkoff has 
demonstrated that a number of familiar fiduciary duties—including the 
duty of impartiality, the duty to invest for total return, and the duty of 
care—operate to align the interests of the trustee with those of the 
settlor and the beneficiaries.2  Melanie Leslie, in arguing that settlor and 
trustee should not enjoy unlimited freedom to vary the content of 
fiduciary duties, has emphasized that information asymmetries 
undermine the assumption that the trust agreement will provide optimal 
control of agency costs.3  Both Sitkoff and Leslie have focused on the 
difficulties inherent in relying on the market to monitor trustee 
behavior, and thus control agency costs.4  And even John Langbein, in 
the course of his controversial proposal to jettison the no-further-inquiry 
rule, concedes that the “difficulty of beneficiary monitoring underscores 
the importance of the duty of loyalty.”5 
Agency cost analysis of private trusts, however, confronts an 
immediate difficulty: who is the principal?  Two candidates emerge: the 
trust beneficiaries, who are often treated as the “equitable owners” of 
the trust property, and the trust settlor, without whose property (and 
 
 *  Mack Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.  I would like to thank Greg 
Alexander, Melanie Leslie, Rob Sitkoff, Jeff Stake, and Michael Yu for insightful comments on  
an earlier draft, and Christine O’Neil for invaluable research assistance. 
 1 “Agency costs” refer to the losses suffered by a principal because her agent’s interests—
and hence incentives to act—diverge from those of the principal.  The principal can reduce those 
costs by monitoring the agent’s activities or by bonding the agent.  Hence, Jensen and Meckling 
have defined agency costs as the sum of the principal’s monitoring expenditures, the principal’s 
bonding expenditures, and the principal’s residual loss—the remaining reduction in the 
principal’s welfare as a result of the divergence of the interests of the principal and the agent.  
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976). 
 2 Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 650-
57 (2004). 
 3 Melanie B. Leslie, Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary Duties and the Limits of Default Rules, 94 
GEO. L.J. 67 (2005). 
 4 Sitkoff, supra note 2, at 645-46; Leslie, supra note 3, at 82-84. 
 5 John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best 
Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 929, 957 (2005). 
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without whose consent) there would be no trust.6  Existing trust doctrine 
equivocates on who serves as the trustee’s principal: the trust settlor 
may impose a variety of enforceable obligations on the trustee, but 
those restrictions are enforceable only by the trust beneficiaries, not by 
the trust settlor.7 
Often, this equivocal answer presents few practical difficulties.  On 
many issues, the interests of the settlor and the interests of the 
beneficiary are aligned; the settlor’s primary objective is to benefit the 
beneficiaries, and if the trustee is serving the beneficiaries, the trustee is 
also serving the settlor.  But to conclude that a trustee who serves the 
beneficiaries also serves the settlor does not address the basic agency 
cost problem: how do we assure that the trustee provides the care and 
loyalty the settlor and the beneficiaries expect? 
Moreover, on some issues, equivocation about identifying the 
trustee’s principal presents more significant difficulties.  Suppose, for 
instance, the settlor wishes to control trust distributions in ways that the 
beneficiaries (or some subset of beneficiaries) do not like.  Treating the 
beneficiaries as the trustee’s principal is inconsistent with much 
traditional doctrine,8 and particularly with the emerging contractarian 
theory of the trust.9  But treating the settlor as the principal also creates 
a significant practical and conceptual problem: the settlor will typically 
be dead for much of the trust’s duration.  Practically, the settlor’s 
demise often makes it impossible to determine whether the trustee is 
faithfully representing the wishes of the dead settlor.  Even if the settlor 
left explicit instructions on some matters, the settlor could not possibly 
have anticipated all of the decisions a trustee would face.  And that 
 
 6 Robert Sitkoff has argued that because the joint intent of contracting parties carries with it 
a presumption of Pareto optimality, the settlor should generally be treated as the trustee’s 
principal.  Sitkoff, supra note 2, at 644-48.  For another recent exploration of some of the issues, 
see Alan Newman, The Intention of the Settlor Under the Uniform Trust Code: Whose Property Is 
It, Anyway?, 38 AKRON L. REV. 649 (2005). 
 7 Moreover, there are subtle differences between the predominant approaches in the United 
States and England.  As one court has put it: 
The American cases recognize primarily the privilege of the donor to qualify his gift as 
he pleases within legal limits.  Cujus est dare ejus est disponere.  The English courts 
concentrate their predominant attention upon the situation of the beneficiary who being 
substantially the owner of the trust estate should be permitted in their judgment to deal 
with it as he wishes. 
Speth v. Speth, 74 A.2d 344, 347 (N.J. 1950).  See generally Sitkoff, supra note 2, at 662-63 
(discussing differences between the American approach and the English approach, which tends to 
treat beneficiaries as the trustee’s principals). 
 8 For instance, traditional doctrine restricts the power of the trust beneficiaries to compel 
modification or termination of the trust when termination would frustrate a material purpose of 
the settlor.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2001). 
 9 See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 
625 (1995); Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal 
and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 447-49 (1998). 
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problem—the settlor’s lack of foresight—becomes more serious as the 
duration of the trust increases.10  Conceptually, treating the dead settlor 
as the principal raises a time-honored question in the law of trusts and 
estates: for how long should current decisions be controlled by the dead 
hand of a settlor who has long since met his maker?11 
Suppose now that we superimpose on the traditional trust 
framework a “trust protector”—a person selected by the settlor to 
represent the settlor’s interests in making specified trust decisions that 
the settlor will be unable to make.  As the living embodiment of the 
dead settlor, the protector has the potential to mitigate the foresight 
problems associated with dead hand control.  At the same time, the 
protector has the potential to serve as a monitor of the trustee’s 
performance, reducing agency costs in that respect as well. 
To be sure, the office of trust protector did not develop to “solve” 
the agency cost problems associated with private express trusts.  
Instead, as Part I of this Article demonstrates, the trust protector 
emerged in the context of offshore trusts, where trust settlors have 
sought to maintain as much control over trust assets as possible while 
shielding those assets from creditors.  But lawyers have recognized the 
potential of the office and have quickly adapted the trust protector to 
serve other functions. 
Appointment of a trust protector, however, provides at best a 
modest amelioration of the agency cost problem, not a complete 
solution.  The trust protector, too, is only an agent.  The settlor did not 
choose to relinquish title to the protector but chose instead to give the 
protector limited powers to guide trustee behavior.  As a result, the 
emergence of trust protectors raises a new set of agency cost problems: 
first, do protectors owe any enforceable duties to the trust beneficiaries, 
or to anyone else; second, how, if at all, do the powers conferred on the 
trust protector affect the responsibilities of the trustee? 
The emergence of the trust protector is so new that current doctrine 
has not yet answered these questions.  And the answers may differ 
depending on the purposes for which the protector was appointed and 
the powers the settlor has conferred on the protector.  This Article 
attempts to situate the trust protector in the web of relationships that 
surround the private express trust, exploring the agency costs avoided—
and created—with the advent of trust protectors, and examining the 
ramifications for fiduciary duty law. 
 
 10 See generally Robert C. Ellickson, Adverse Possession and Perpetuities Law: Two Dents in 
the Libertarian Model of Property Rights, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 723, 734-35 (1986). 
 11 See generally LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND (1955). 
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I.     THE EMERGENCE OF THE TRUST PROTECTOR 
A.     Origins in the Growth of the Asset Protection Trust 
 
Trust protectors are not indigenous to American trust law.  Even 
before the last two decades, some English trusts used protectors to 
reassure settlors uneasy about the powers conferred on the trustee.12  
But protectors were imported into the United States from offshore 
jurisdictions seeking to attract asset protection business.  The typical 
offshore asset protection trust names as a trustee a person or institution 
beyond the personal jurisdiction of American courts.  The reason for 
this practice is evident: if the trustee were subject to the jurisdiction of 
American courts, an American court could order the trustee to make 
trust assets available to American creditors, and could impose sanctions 
on the trustee for failure to comply with the court order.13 
Despite their strong desire to protect their assets from creditors, 
American settlors of offshore trusts have often been reluctant to 
relinquish all control over their assets to a foreign entity.  As a result, 
trust instruments have frequently named a “trust protector” with various 
powers over the trust and the trustee.  Sometimes, the settlor named 
himself as protector,14 but the settlor who named himself as protector 
increased the risk that an American court would order him to compel 
the trustee to make the money available to trust creditors—defeating the 
purpose of the asset protection trust.15  Many settlors, therefore, opted to 
name a third party as protector. 
In determining what powers to confer on the trust protector, 
settlors had to weigh competing risks.  By conferring broad affirmative 
powers on the protector—even if the protector was not the settlor-
beneficiary—the trust settlor would increase the risk that an American 
court with personal jurisdiction over the protector would pierce the trust 
at the behest of the settlor’s creditors.  The settlor could minimize that 
risk by leaving the protector only with power to veto the trustee’s 
 
 12 See Antony Duckworth, Protectors—Fish or Fowl?, 4 J. INT’L TR. & CORP. PLAN. 137, 
168 (1995). 
 13 Cf. Hardy v. Hardy, 5 Cal. Rptr. 110 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (a court with jurisdiction over a 
trustee can compel the trustee to account for or dispose of trust property located in another state). 
 14 See, e.g., FTC v. Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228, 1242-43 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 15 Id. at 1242. 
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decisions;16 an American court would find it difficult to order the 
protector to veto a decision the trustee had never made.17 
On the other hand, limiting the protector to veto powers would 
reduce the protector’s value for other purposes.  For instance, the settlor 
might want to confer on the protector power to change the situs of the 
trust to take advantage of the enactment of more trust-friendly laws, or 
to escape political or legal instability in the original situs.  The trustee, 
who might have strong ties to the original situs, might be reluctant to 
make such a change.  Moreover, the settlor might want to give the 
protector power to remove the trustee upon suspicion or evidence of 
malfeasance.  But to accomplish these objectives, the settlor would have 
to accept increased risk of intervention by an American court.18  Quite 
naturally, various settlors have balanced these objectives differently, 
resulting in wide variety among the powers conferred on protectors of 
offshore trusts. 
Use of protectors in offshore trusts originated out of the creativity 
of lawyers, not out of express statutory authorization.  But as the use of 
protectors became more prevalent, a number of offshore jurisdictions 
did enact legislation authorizing use of protectors.  The Cook Islands 
International Trust Amendment Act of 1989 began the move toward 
statutory recognition, and other offshore jurisdictions followed suit.  
Although all of the statutes recognize that the protector is the holder of a 
power,19 the statutes otherwise embrace significantly different 
conceptions of the protector.  Thus, the statute enacted in the British 
Virgin Islands provides expressly that a protector “is not liable to the 
beneficiaries for the bona fide exercise of the power.”20  By contrast, the 
Belize statute provides that “[i]n the exercise of his office a protector 
shall owe a fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries of the trust or to the 
purpose for which the trust is created.”21 
 
 16 See Gideon Rothschild, Establishing and Drafting Offshore Asset Protection Trusts, 23 
EST. PLAN. 65, 70 (1996) (“The protector’s powers should generally be drafted as negative 
powers and subject to the anti-duress provisions to protect against an order compelling the 
protector to exercise control over the trust.”). 
 17 See Robert T. Danforth, Rethinking the Law of Creditors’ Rights in Trusts, 53 HASTINGS 
L.J. 287, 309 (2002). 
 18 Cf. Affordable Media, 179 F.3d at 1242 (trust settlors name themselves as protectors; court 
relies on their occupancy of office of protector to conclude that settlors retained power to force 
repatriation of trust assets). 
 19 See, e.g., International Trusts Act of 1984 § 7 (as amended 1989) (Cook Islands) 
(“‘Protector’ in relation to an international trust means a person who is the holder of a power 
which when invoked is capable of directing a trustee in matters relating to the trust . . . .”). 
 20 Trustee Ordinance § 86(3) (1961) (as amended by the Trustee (Amendment) Act (1993)) 
(British Virgin Islands). 
 21 Belize Trusts Act 1992 § 16(5), available at http://www.ifsc.gov.bz/acts/trustsact.pdf.  See 
generally MAURIZIO LUPOI, TRUSTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 257-62 (Simon Dix trans., 2000). 
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Despite the statutory differences, appointment of a trust protector 
has become standard in offshore asset protection trusts.22  And, in more 
recent years, the use of protectors has spread to domestic trusts as well. 
B.     Domestic Trusts 
1.     Limited Foresight and Changed Circumstances 
 
Widespread use of protectors in offshore trusts led American 
lawyers to recognize the protectors’ potential to solve problems facing 
settlors of domestic trusts.  One such problem involves how to adapt the 
trust’s provisions to account for circumstances not foreseen by the 
settlor at the time of the trust’s creation.23  As trusts become longer in 
duration, the problems of change and inadequacy of foresight increase 
in importance.24  Changes in law, for instance, might result in frustration 
of the settlor’s purposes.  Similarly, unforeseen changes in family 
situation could make modification of the trust terms desirable.  Judicial 
modification or termination of the trust is always a possibility, but 
existing doctrine places a number of obstacles in front of parties who 
seek judicial modification.25  Moreover, a judicial proceeding costs 
money, which will typically operate to deplete trust resources. 
 
 22 Donovan W. M. Waters, The Protector: New Wine in Old Bottles?, in TRENDS IN 
CONTEMPORARY TRUST LAW 64 (A.J. Oakeley ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1996). 
 23 See Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Dangerous Liaisons: Corporate Law, Trust Law, 
and Interdoctrinal Legal Transplants, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 651, 664 (2002) (noting the need for 
flexibility because the settlor will have passed from the scene when many unanticipated events 
unfold). 
 24 See generally Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition to Abolish The Rule Against 
Perpetuities: R.I.P. for the R.A.P., 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2097 (2003) (cataloging reasons for a 
move in many states to authorize perpetual trusts). 
 25 Black letter law has long been that beneficiaries can compel termination or modification of  
a trust if all of them consent, so long as there is no material purpose in continuing the trust.  See  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 337 (1959).  For an application of the black letter law, 
see, e.g., Am. Nat’l Bank of Cheyenne v. Miller, 899 P.2d 1337 (Wyo. 1995) (authorizing 
termination).  If, however, the trust is spendthrift, legislatures and courts have often concluded 
that termination would frustrate a material purpose, thus precluding termination.  See, e.g., CAL. 
PROB. CODE § 15404(b) (West 2005); Culver v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 70 N.E.2d 163 
(N.Y. 1946).  Other courts have been even more restrictive, finding material purposes inconsistent 
with termination simply because the trust instrument provides a life interest to an income 
beneficiary.  See Adams v. Link, 145 A.2d 753 (Conn. 1958). 
  The drafters of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts have attempted to liberalize traditional 
termination rules in two ways.  First, the black letter of section 65 permits termination even if a 
material purpose would be frustrated, so long as a court concludes that “the reason for 
termination . . . outweighs the material purpose.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65(2) 
(2003).  Second, a comment to section 65 provides that a spendthrift provision does not by itself 
establish that termination would frustrate a material purpose of the trust.  Instead, a spendthrift 
clause furnishes only “some indication” of a material purpose inconsistent with termination.  Id. § 
65 cmt. e. 
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The settlor could, of course, account for these problems by making 
the trust revocable, but settlors have a variety of reasons for parting 
more completely with any interest in the trust property.26  Moreover, if 
the trust is designed to be perpetual, revocability is not an option, 
because the settlor is in no position to revoke after her death. 
Alternatively, the settlor could confer on one or more beneficiaries 
a right to modify the trust’s terms.  This alternative, however, creates 
two potential problems, at least if the instrument authorizes the 
beneficiary to modify in favor of herself.  First, a beneficiary with 
power to modify might act in self-interest, frustrating the settlor’s 
wishes.  Second, the power to modify might be construed as creating in 
the beneficiary a general power of appointment, generating unfortunate 
tax consequences.27 
To avoid these problems, the settlor could give modification 
powers to the trustee, but trustees are often reluctant to modify or 
terminate trusts, even when termination would serve the settlor’s 
interests.28  Moreover, the settlor may choose the trustee for reasons 
unrelated to the trustee’s ability to account for the settlor’s imperfect 
foresight. 
Against this background, the trust protector offers what may be an 
attractive alternative—a person whose primary function is to exercise 
judgment on behalf of the trust settlor.  The model may be most 
attractive when the protector is a trusted confidante of the settlor, but 
that model can only work for the lifetime of the confidante.  Even a 
professional protector, or a successor chosen by the settlor’s original 
protector, may be superior to the other available alternatives for dealing 
with deficiencies in the settlor’s foresight. 
 
2.     Policing the Trustee 
 
 
 26 For instance, if the trust were revocable, the settlor would be treated as the owner of the 
trust property for federal income tax purposes.  26 U.S.C. § 676 (2000). 
 27 See 26 U.S.C. § 2041 (property over which decedent enjoyed general power of 
appointment included in decedent’s estate); 26 C.F.R. § 20.2041-1(b) (2006) (“[A] power given 
to a decedent to affect the beneficial enjoyment of trust property or its income by altering, 
amending, or revoking the trust instrument or terminating the trust is a power of appointment.”); 
see also Alexander A. Bove, Jr., The Trust Protector: Trust(y) Watchdog or Expensive Exotic 
Pet?, 30 EST. PLAN. 390, 395 (2003). 
 28 Thus, trustees sometimes challenge the termination of trusts—generally unsuccessfully—in 
order to preserve their right to commissions.  See, e.g., Moore v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of 
Macon, 130 S.E.2d 718, 721 (Ga. 1963) (finding that the incidental benefit which the trustee may 
derive from future commissions is not of such a character as gives it a vested right to the 
continuance of the trust); see generally 4 SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 337 (4th ed. 2001). 
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Although trust protectors became popular in a context where the 
settlor’s main objective was to protect trust assets against settlor’s 
creditors, the protector device also has potential to protect trust assets 
against the actions of the settlor’s chosen trustee.  When the settlor 
creates a trust, she conveys to the trustee legal title to the trust property.  
Inherent in the trust, however, is the settlor’s intention that the trustee 
not treat the property as his own.  Instead, trust law presumes that the 
settlor wants the trustee to manage the trust assets prudently and in the 
interest of the trust beneficiaries.29  Fiduciary duty law gives content to 
that presumption, which the settlor can modify with appropriate 
language in the trust instrument.30 
A critical issue remains, however: how does the settlor ensure that 
the trustee acts in accordance with the settlor’s expectations?  Trust 
law’s traditional response is to enlist the trust beneficiaries as monitors, 
through the mechanism of an action for breach of fiduciary duty.31  By 
subjecting the trustee to potential liability, trust law encourages the 
trustee to comply with settlor’s instructions.  But monitoring by the 
beneficiaries is both imperfect and costly.  First, the beneficiaries 
themselves often lack the expertise to detect breach.32  Second, the 
beneficiaries may be dependent on the trustee, and hence they may be 
reluctant to take action to discipline the trustee.33  In combination, these 
factors suggest potential underdeterrence of trustee misbehavior.34  In 
addition, of course, the trust beneficiaries will bear much of the 
litigation cost.  And, as Professor Leslie has demonstrated, market 
monitoring—which has some potential for disciplining fiduciaries in the 
corporate context—is wholly inadequate in the trust context.35 
By contrast, if the settlor appoints a trust protector, the protector 
might be in a position to relieve the trust beneficiaries of the primary 
 
 29 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 76-78 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) 
(providing that the trustee has a duty to administer the trust “in accordance with the terms of the 
trust and applicable law,” and then describing the duty of prudence and duty of loyalty). 
 30 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 76, cmt. on Subsection (1); b(1) (Tentative Draft 
No. 4, 2005) (“[T]he normal standards of trustee conduct prescribed by trust fiduciary law may, at 
least to some extent, be modified by the terms of the trust.  Briefly stated, much of trust law, 
especially trust fiduciary law, is default law—but some is not.”); see also John H. Langbein, 
Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1105 (2004); Langbein, supra note 9, 
at 660. 
 31 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205 (1959) (discussing liability in the 
case of a breach of trust); see also Rock & Wachter, supra note 23, at 653-55. 
 32 See Leslie, supra note 3, at 84. 
 33 See Benjamin G. Carter, Relief for Beneficiaries Suing for Breach of Fiduciary Duty: 
Payment of Accounting Costs Before Trial, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1411, 1421-26 (1998). 
 34 See Melanie B. Leslie, In Defense of the No Further Inquiry Rule: A Response to Professor 
John Langbein, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 541, 558-62 (2005). 
 35 See Leslie, supra note 3, at 79-84.  But see Jonathan R. Macey, Private Trusts for the 
Provision of Public Goods, 37 EMORY L.J. 295, 317 (1988) (arguing that simplicity of trust 
decisions reduces the need for market monitoring of trustees). 
  
2006] TRUST PROTECTORS  2769 
 
responsibility for monitoring the trustee.  Moreover, with appropriate 
language in the trust instrument, the protector might be able to avoid the 
cost of litigation.  The settlor, for instance, could require the trustee to 
obtain the protector’s consent before taking particular actions and could 
even give the protector power to remove the trustee without judicial 
approval.36  In this way, the trust protector can serve, at least in theory, 
as an efficient check on the agency costs associated with private express 
trusts.  It is this insight, and its doctrinal implications, that serves as the 
focus for Part III. 
 
C.     Statutory Recognition 
 
Until recently, no American statute made any mention of trust 
protectors.  Over the last eight years, however, five states have enacted 
statutes explicitly authorizing or defining trust protectors.  South Dakota 
enacted the first such statute in 1997,37 followed by Idaho in 1999,38 
Alaska39 and Wyoming40 in 2003, and Tennessee in 2004.41  The Alaska 
statute differs significantly from the statutes enacted in the other four 
states.  In the other states, the statutes insulate trustees—generally 
denominated “excluded fiduciaries”—from liability for following 
directions given to them by trust protectors.42  The Alaska statute 
includes no comparable provision.  The statutes also differ significantly 
on the protectors’ own liabilities.  The Alaska statute provides explicitly 
that, subject to contrary provisions in the trust instrument, “a trust 
protector is not liable or accountable as a trustee or fiduciary . . . .”43  By 
 
 36 Indeed, this might be the most common power conferred on the trust protector.  See 
Waters, supra note 22, at 105. 
 37 1997 S.D. Sess. Laws 280, § 1 (codified as amended at S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 55-1B-1 
to 55-1B-5 (2005)). 
 38 1999 Idaho Sess. Laws 331, § 1 (codified at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-7-501 (2005)). 
 39 2003 Alaska Sess. Laws 130, § 1 (codified at ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.370 (2005)). 
 40 2003 Wyo. Sess. Laws 124, § 1 (codified as amended at WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-710 – 4-
10-718 (2005)). 
 41 The Tennessee statute, 2004 Tenn. Pub. Acts 537, § 66, as well as its Section Comment, 
can be found at TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15-808 (2005). 
 42 The Tennessee statute, based on the Uniform Trust Code, is somewhat equivocal.  The 
comment to the section tracks the comment to the UTC, which suggests that the trustee bears 
minimal oversight responsibility.  See text accompanying note 49, infra.  But the text of the 
statute includes a provision absent from the UTC.  That provision insulates the trustee from 
liability when following the directions of the protector.  TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15-808(e). 
  The other statutes unequivocally insulate the trustee from liability for following the 
protector’s directions.  See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-7-501(2); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-1B-5; 
WYO. STAT ANN. §§ 4-10-715, 4-10-717.  These states typically denominate trustees who have 
received directions from a trust protector as “excluded fiduciaries.”  See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 55-1B-1. 
 43 ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.370(d). 
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contrast, statutes in the other four states direct that a protector should be 
treated as a fiduciary unless the trust instrument provides to the 
contrary.44 
The Uniform Trust Code (UTC) also makes provision for trust 
protectors.  Although the trust protector label appears only in a 
Comment,45 the statute itself speaks in terms of a trust that confers 
“upon a person . . . power to direct certain actions of the trustee.”46  The 
UTC does not provide trustees with absolute immunity from liability for 
following the directions of a trust protector.  Section 808 provides that 
the trustee shall act in accordance with the exercise of a power held by a 
protector “unless the attempted exercise is manifestly contrary to the 
terms of the trust or the trustee knows the attempted exercise would 
constitute a serious breach of a fiduciary duty that the person holding 
the power owes to the beneficiaries of the trust.”47  Thus, the UTC 
standard requires that the trustee exercise “minimal oversight 
responsibility” before following the protector’s directions.48  Moreover, 
the UTC creates a presumption that the holder of a “power to direct” is 
a fiduciary.49 
Most states, however, have made no statutory provision for 
protectors and have not yet developed case law defining the 
relationships among protectors, trustees, settlors, and beneficiaries.50  
Moreover, even in states that have labeled protectors as fiduciaries, the 
scope of the fiduciary duties owed by the protector remain substantially 
uncertain.  It is against that uncertainty that we turn to the role 
protectors might play in controlling agency costs. 
 
 44 IDAHO CODE § 15-7-501(4); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS, § 55-1B-4; TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15-
808(d); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-711. 
 45 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808 cmt. (2005). 
 46 Id. at § 808(b). 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at § 808 cmt. 
 49 Id. at § 808(d). 
 50 A Washington statute, however, provides, without mentioning trust protectors by that 
name, that a person with a power to direct or control the acts of a fiduciary shall be deemed to be 
a fiduciary.  WASH. REV. CODE § 11.100.130 (West 2005). 
  Moreover, several states have expressly provided that when the trust instrument vests in 
someone other than the trustee power to make investment decisions, the trustee should be treated 
as an “excluded fiduciary” and should bear no liability for losses resulting from an investment 
made by the direction of someone else with investment powers.  Excluded fiduciary terminology 
predates the advent of trust protectors, and appears in statutes in a number of states to insulate 
trustees from liability when acting pursuant to a direction authorized by the trust instrument.  See 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-1-307 (2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-194 (2005); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 1339.43 (LexisNexis 2005); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 114.003 (Vernon 2005); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 26-5.2 (2006); see also IND. CODE ANN. § 30-4-3-9 (2005) (relieving trustee of 
liability without using excluded fiduciary language). 
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II.     THE PROTECTOR AND AGENCY COSTS 
A.     Monitoring the Trustee 
1.     The Optimistic Model 
 
Agency costs arise because it is often difficult for a principal to 
observe whether the agent is acting on the principal’s behalf.51  The 
principal could eliminate agency costs altogether by aligning the agent’s 
compensation perfectly with the agent’s efforts, but that would 
transform the agent into the principal; the original principal would no 
longer have any interest in the agent’s actions.  That, in turn, would 
defeat the principal’s purpose in creating an agency relationship. 
The best the principal can do is to assure that some system is in 
place to monitor the agent’s performance and to accept some losses 
resulting from the divergence between the interests of the principal and 
the agent.  If the cost of monitoring and the losses resulting from 
divergence prove too great, the principal will not create the agency 
relationship. 
Private express trusts generate agency costs.  The settlor cannot 
observe the trustee’s behavior and does not want the trustee to reap the 
benefits of the trustee’s decisions.  Moreover, unlike corporate 
fiduciaries, whose behavior as agents is often subject to market 
discipline,52 the typical trustee faces little market pressure in the 
performance of its duties.53  As a result, the success of the trust depends 
on the strength of the mechanisms available for monitoring trustee 
behavior.  In the prevailing model, fiduciary duties enforceable by trust 
beneficiaries provide that mechanism.54  The trustee’s duties of care, 
loyalty, impartiality, and the duty to provide information to the 
beneficiaries all operate to constrain a trustee who would otherwise 
shirk or ignore the interests of the trustee’s principals.55 
 
 51 See Sitkoff, supra note 2, at 643-46. 
 52 See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor 
Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 856-57 (1992). 
 53 See Sitkoff, supra note 2, at 643-46; Leslie, supra note 3, at 99. 
 54 See generally Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472, 483 (1990) (“A defining characteristic 
of a trust arrangement is that the beneficiary has the legal power to enforce the trustee’s duty to 
comply with the terms of the trust.”). 
 55 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 77 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (duty of 
prudence); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (duty of 
loyalty); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 79 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (duty of 
impartiality); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 82 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (duty to 
furnish information to beneficiaries). 
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The prospect of fiduciary duty litigation, however, has several 
deficiencies as a mechanism for assuring that the trustee acts in the 
interest of the trust settlor.  First, trustees understand that actions for 
breach of fiduciary duty are costly to the beneficiaries, in more than one 
way.  Most obviously, the beneficiaries face litigation costs.  If the 
beneficiaries are ultimately successful in their effort to establish the 
trustee’s breach, they may be able to recover those costs from the trust 
or the trust estate.56  Recovery from the trust estate, however, would be 
a hollow victory, because in most cases, the beneficiaries are the 
equitable owners of the trust estate.  Moreover, when the beneficiaries’ 
action proves unsuccessful, even the trustee’s defense costs will 
ultimately be borne by the trust.57  Of perhaps equal importance, many 
trust beneficiaries are dependent on the trustee, particularly if the trustee 
enjoys discretion about distributions among beneficiaries.58  These 
factors will lead rational, educated beneficiaries to refrain from bringing 
breach of trust actions even when those actions have a reasonable 
prospect of success, thereby resulting in under-deterrence of breach by 
trustees. 
Second, the assumption of rational, educated beneficiaries is a 
heroic one.  Many trust beneficiaries are the recipients of interests in a 
trust for a reason (other than the potential tax advantages emerging from 
 
 56 Compare Shriner v. Dyer, 462 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (beneficiaries recover 
litigation fees from trust, even after failing to recover them from trustees individually after 
establishing trust mismanagement), and Palmer v. Hartford Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 279 A.2d 
726 (Conn. 1971) (beneficiaries recover from the trust itself the litigation costs they incurred in 
opposing proposed sale of trust property at a price far lower than price purchaser ultimately paid), 
with Feinberg v. Adolph K. Feinberg Hotel Trust, 922 S.W.2d 21 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (trustee’s 
misappropriation of assets so reprehensible that it warranted ordering trustee to pay beneficiary’s 
costs), and Reynolds v. First Ala. Bank, 471 So. 2d 1238 (Ala. 1985) (trustee bears beneficiaries’ 
attorneys fees in successful action for breach of fiduciary duty).  See generally 3 SCOTT ON 
TRUSTS, supra note 28, § 188.4 (“[W]here it is held that the trustee is subject to a surcharge, the 
expense is payable by the trustee personally.”). 
  Some state statutes appear to mandate that the trustee bear the beneficiaries’ litigation 
costs, including attorneys fees, in cases where the beneficiary has successfully maintained an 
action for breach of trust.  See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 30-4-3-11(a)(4) (2005); CAL. PROB. CODE 
§ 17211(b) (West 2006).  Other statutes appear to give reviewing courts discretion to assess the 
successful beneficiaries’ litigation costs against the trustee.  See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-
193(a)(4) (2005). 
 57 See, e.g., Jessup v. Smith, 119 N.E. 403, 404 (N.Y. 1918) (Cardozo, J.) (holding that 
trustee was entitled to reimbursement for attorneys fees because the trustee “owed a duty to the 
estate to stand his ground against unjust attack.  He resisted an attempt to wrest the administration 
of the trust from one selected by the testator and to place it in strange hands.”); Saulsbury v. 
Denton Nat’l Bank, 335 A.2d 199 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975); Weidlich v. Comley, 267 F.2d 133 
(2d Cir. 1959); see also Carter, supra note 33, at 1421-26 (1998); 3 SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra 
note 28 § 188.4 (4th ed. 2001) (“The trustee can properly pay out of the trust estate expenses of 
litigation incurred in a successful attempt to prevent the beneficiaries from subjecting the trustee 
to a surcharge.”). 
 58 See generally Leslie, supra note 3, at 87. 
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the marital deduction59 and the generation-skipping transfer tax 
exemption60).  If the trust settlor had confidence in the financial acumen 
of the beneficiaries, the settlor might well have passed his assets to the 
beneficiaries free of trust, eliminating the agency cost problem 
altogether.  Trustees as a group should understand the limited capacity 
of trust beneficiaries, creating another potential for under-deterrence. 
Third, the preferences of the trust beneficiaries may not perfectly 
reflect the settlor’s preferences.  If the trustee takes an action with the 
approval of the trust beneficiaries, the trustee is unlikely to face an 
action for breach of fiduciary duty; the settlor is dead, and may in any 
event lack standing to bring action for breach.61  This fact, too, reduces 
the value of fiduciary duty litigation, or its prospect, as a mechanism for 
monitoring agency costs. 
Appointment of a trust protector addresses and mitigates each of 
these concerns.  First, if the protector has power to direct the trustee to 
take particular actions, or even power to veto particular actions, the 
protector can avoid the litigation costs associated with actions for 
breach of fiduciary duty.  Second, the settlor can choose a protector 
with the business acumen necessary to evaluate the actions taken by the 
trustee.  And third, the protector acts as the settlor’s surrogate; the 
settlor can choose a protector whose focus is on achieving the settlor’s 
objectives, even when those objectives conflict with the preferences of 
the beneficiaries. 
None of this is to suggest that appointment of a trust protector 
eliminates agency costs from the settlor/trustee relationship.  But on this 
optimistic account, the protector operates to ameliorate significantly the 
agency cost issues that confront the traditional trust.  The protector 
gives the settlor an additional tool in policing the trustee; if the tool 
proves unhelpful, the settlor is no worse than she was before—she is 
still left with the traditional mechanisms available for disciplining 
trustees. 
 
 59 26 U.S.C. § 2056(a) (2000). 
 60 26 U.S.C. § 2631. 
 61 Established doctrine holds that a settlor who retains no beneficial interest in a trust cannot 
bring an action against a trustee for breach of fiduciary duty unless the settlor has entered into a 
separate contract with the trustee to ensure the trustee’s performance.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TRUSTS § 200 cmt. b.  For applicaton of the rule, see, e.g., Sanders v. Citizens Nat’l Bank of 
Leesburg, 585 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 1991) (settlor of life insurance trust has no standing to 
sue trustee for negligence and breach of trust); Edmondson v. Edmondson, 226 N.W.2d 615 
(Minn. 1975) (settlor cannot maintain action for accounting when settlor lacked beneficial interest 
in the trust).  Professor Gaubatz has discussed a number of exceptions to the general rule against 
settlor standing, and Professor Langbein has advocated that the traditional rule should be reversed 
to authorize settlor standing in the absence of a contrary instruction in the trust instrument.  See 
John T. Gaubatz, Grantor Enforcement of Trusts: Standing in One Private Law Setting, 62 N.C. 
L. REV. 905 (1984); Langbein, supra note 9, at 664. 
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2.     Wrinkles in the Account 
 
The optimistic account of the trust protector as a tool in the effort 
to reduce agency costs ignores one important fact: the protector himself 
is an agent.  When a trust settlor names a trust protector, the settlor 
creates new sets of relationships—settlor/protector, 
beneficiary/protector, and trustee/protector—that complicate analysis of 
agency costs.  This section examines several of the complications. 
 
 
a.     Disciplining the Protector 
 
On the vast majority of trust issues, the settlor’s interests and those 
of the beneficiary are closely aligned.  In those cases, agency costs are 
minimized when the protector acts as the settlor would want it to.  But 
what guarantee is there that the protector will do so?  Personal loyalty to 
the settlor acts to discipline the protector in some set of cases, 
particularly when the protector is a close friend, confidant, or relative of 
the settlor.  But what of professional protectors, or successor protectors 
who enjoy no strong personal bond to the settlor? 
Even if the settlor were to provide detailed instructions to the 
protector (which would defeat much of the purpose of appointing a 
protector), there is no obvious market mechanism for assuring that the 
protector follows the settlor’s instructions.62  The protector is not likely 
to have a financial interest in complying with those instructions; 
protector compensation cannot easily be tied to the degree of fealty the 
protector displays towards the settlor’s wishes.63  Moreover, the 
protector’s performance will often be impossible to measure. 
In the absence of personal loyalty and market forces as 
mechanisms to discipline protectors, legal liability rules provide an 
alternative enforcement mechanism.  Because the trust settlor will  
generally be dead when significant decisions face the protector, 
enforcement of duties will necessarily fall to the trust beneficiaries.  
Beneficiary enforcement generates two familiar difficulties.  First, even 
 
 62 Professors Gilson and Kraakman have made similar observations with respect to outside 
corporate directors.  Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An 
Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 875-76 (1991) (noting absence of 
evidence that market for outside directors exists at all); see generally Black, supra note 52, at 
850-51 (noting that the effectiveness of agents watching agents depends in considerable measure 
on institutional detail). 
 63 Cf. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 62, at 875 (noting that corporations cannot pay outside 
directors enough to create appropriate incentives to monitor management). 
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when the interests of the trust beneficiaries are perfectly aligned with 
those of the settlor, beneficiary enforcement replicates the costs 
associated with fiduciary duty litigation against trustees.  Second, when 
the settlor’s apparent preferences diverge from the interests of the 
beneficiaries, the more enforceable rights the legal regime confers on 
the beneficiaries, the greater the incentives for the protector to act as the 
agent of the beneficiaries rather than the agent of the settlor. 
 
b.     Why Not Co-Trustees? 
 
For the settlor who seeks to monitor trustee behavior, there is an 
obvious alternative to appointment of a trust protector: appoint co-
trustees, each of whom can monitor the other’s actions.  Appointment of 
co-trustees generates a number of advantages for the settlor.  Unlike the 
uncharted law surrounding trust protectors, there is a well-established 
body of law governing the responsibilities of co-trustees.  Because co-
trustees are generally entitled to exercise trust powers only by consent 
of a majority,64 no trustee can act without persuading co-trustees of the 
merits of the action—assuring that no individual trustee will act 
arbitrarily.  Reinforcing that protection against arbitrary action is the 
rule that makes one co-trustee liable for another co-trustee’s breach of 
fiduciary duty if reasonable care would have prevented the breach.65  
Moreover, one co-trustee is liable for another’s self-dealing, on the 
theory that the disinterested trustee’s duty of care extends to assuring 
that the co-trustee does not breach his duty of loyalty.66  In light of the 
monitoring possibilities that accompany appointment of co-trustees, 
why would a trust settlor find it attractive to appoint a protector instead? 
 
 64 At common law, trustees of private trusts could act only by unanimous consent.  That rule, 
however, has generally been abandoned by statute.  See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW 
§ 10-10.7 (McKinney 2005) (providing that fiduciary powers may be exercised by majority of 
fiduciaries); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 39 (2003) (concurrence of both 
trustees necessary when trust names two trustees; concurrence of majority necessary when there 
are three or more trustees). 
 65 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 81(2) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (“Each 
trustee also has a duty to use reasonable care to prevent a co-trustee from committing a breach of 
trust and, if a breach of trust occurs, to obtain redress.”); see also id. at cmt. e (establishing that 
co-trustee is liable for trustee’s breaches if co-trustee participated or acquiesced in the breach, 
improperly delegated administration to the breaching trustee, or enabled the trustee to commit the 
breach by failing to exercise reasonable care); CAL. PROB. CODE § 16402 (Deering 2006).  For 
cases applying the general rules to hold co-trustees liable, see, e.g. Rutanen v. Ballard, 678 
N.E.2d 133 (Mass. 1997) (co-trustee who abandoned administration duties to trustee and failed to 
inform trustee of breach held liable for breach); Estate of Chrisman, 746 S.W.2d 285 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1988) (rejecting co-trustee’s argument that she should not be liable because she deferred to 
decisions of co-trustee). 
 66 See, e.g., In re Rothko, 372 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1977); In re Durston’s Will, 74 N.E.2d 310 
(N.Y. 1947). 
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With respect to offshore trusts, especially those designed for asset 
protection purposes, there is an obvious answer: appointing a domestic 
co-trustee would increase the likelihood that a domestic court could 
exert jurisdiction over the trust assets.67  Once removed from the asset 
protection context, the reasons for appointing a protector instead of a 
co-trustee become less apparent.  In some commonwealth countries, but 
not the United States, the conception of the trustee as a representative of 
the interests of the beneficiaries, rather than the trust settlor, might lead 
settlors to prefer protectors to co-trustees.68  Even in the United States, 
cost might be a factor if one assumes that trustees are entitled to 
commissions and protectors are not, but cost differences become less 
significant when one recognizes that the settlor can generally set the 
compensation of both protectors and trustees by private agreement. 
From an agency cost perspective, the principal reason for choosing 
to appoint a protector rather than a co-trustee is the difference in 
decisionmaking structure that results from the protector/trustee 
relationship.  Co-trustees typically make decisions by consensus; each 
has equal input into trust decisions; each is equally accountable for the 
consequences of those decisions.69  The settlor, by contrast, may prefer 
to repose primary decisionmaking responsibility in a single authority—
the trustee—subject only to intermittent review by the protector.70  The 
authority model of decisionmaking reduces the need for the protector to 
acquire and process information about every aspect of the trust, 
effectively reducing monitoring costs.71  The settlor can use a protector 
 
 67 See generally Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the Bottom, 
85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035, 1089-1100 (2000) (noting the difficulty in obtaining personal 
jurisdiction over an offshore trustee, and exploring the possibility of obtaining in rem jurisdiction 
over trust property). 
 68 See Sitkoff, supra note 2, at 662-63 (noting more significant deference given to beneficiary 
wishes in English trusts).  See generally 4 SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 28, § 337: 
The American courts have laid emphasis on the idea that the wishes of the settlor 
should be controlling except where it would be opposed to some definite policy to give 
effect to his desires.  In England, on the other hand, the courts have felt that although 
the extent of the interests of the beneficiaries depends on the intention of the settlor, the 
control of their interests should be in their own hands, except where the interests of 
others limit such control.  In the United States the courts take the view that the settlor 
can dispose of his property as he likes.  In England the beneficiary of a trust can 
dispose of his interest as he likes. 
Id. 
 69 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 81 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (each trustee 
has a right to participate in trust administration; each has a duty to prevent co-trustees from 
committing breach, and also a duty to seek redress if breach occurs). 
 70 Geoffrey Manne has suggested a similar model for governance of charitable entities—a 
contract relationship with a firm whose principal role is to monitor the behavior of charitable 
boards.  Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable Organizations, 1999 
WIS. L. REV. 227, 262-64 (1999). 
 71 Cf. KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION (1974) (discussing the advantages 
of the authority model of decisionmaking). 
  
2006] TRUST PROTECTORS  2777 
 
as a check on trustee behavior without making the protector a full 
partner in trust decisionmaking.  Moreover, the authority model—
trustee as decisionmaker with protector as a check—also limits (but 
does not eliminate) the potential for quid-pro-quo decisionmaking by 
co-trustees who have to interact on a regular basis with respect to trust 
administration.72 
Of course, the settlor could accomplish the same objectives by 
naming co-trustees and carefully outlining, in the trust instrument, their 
respective responsibilities.  But that approach has its own drawbacks.  
In particular, the settlor is unlikely to anticipate in advance all of the 
ways in which the settlor seeks to alter the background law surrounding 
co-trustees.  As a result, the existence of an established body of co-
trustee law becomes a negative, not an advantage.  If the settlor wants to 
depart significantly from the allocation of duties customarily borne by 
co-trustees, the settlor may be better off avoiding the co-trustee label.73 
 
c.     The Effect of the Protector on the Trustee’s Performance 
 
In an ideal world, appointment of a protector would reduce agency 
costs by providing additional incentives to the trustee to safeguard the 
interests of the trust beneficiaries (thereby advancing the wishes of the 
trust settlor).  In practice, however, there is danger that appointment of 
the protector could have the opposite effect—it could reduce the 
incentives for the trustee to exercise prudence in managing the trust 
assets. 
The danger is three-fold.  First, once a protector is appointed, the 
trustee becomes, to varying degrees, accountable to the protector.74  
 
 72 Some trust protectors might ultimately find it in their financial interests to align themselves 
with trustees rather than trust settlors.  Neither the settlor nor the trust beneficiaries are likely to 
be repeat players in their interactions with the professional trust protector.  By contrast, as 
protectors become more common, protectors and trustees will have ongoing relationships.  
Especially if protectors are in a position to replace trustees, or to name successor trustees, there 
will be significant reasons for trustees to ingratiate themselves with protectors, creating symbiotic 
relationships.  These relationships, however, are unlikely to inure to the benefit of the settlor and 
trust beneficiaries. 
 73 Of course, even if the trust instrument eschews the co-trustee label, courts are likely to 
draw analogies to co-trustees.  See, e.g., Gathright’s Trustee v. Gaut, 124 S.W.2d 782, 783 (Ky. 
Ct. App. 1939) (trust advisors considered as co-trustees with limited authority); Lewis v. Hanson, 
128 A.2d 819, 828 (Del. 1957), aff’d sub nom. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) (trust 
advisor a fiduciary “in the nature of a co-trustee . . . .”). 
 74 Kenneth Arrow has described the problem associated with a regime in which a supposed 
decisionmaker is held accountable for every action he takes: “If every decision of A is to be 
reviewed by B, then all we have really is a shift in the locus of authority from A to B and hence 
no solution to the original problem.”  ARROW, supra note 71, at 78. 
  If the initial assumption is that the trustee was selected as the person or institution best 
suited to making a class of decisions, holding the trustee accountable to a person less suited to 
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That accountability may lead the trustee to be responsive to the 
protector’s wishes even when the trustee believes that the protector’s 
preferences diverge from the interests of the beneficiaries (and the 
settlor).  Especially if the settlor has chosen the trustee because of the 
trustee’s expertise in making the decisions delegated to him, making the 
trustee accountable to the protector threatens to reduce the quality of the 
trustee’s decisions. 
Second, even a trustee who is resolute about maintaining 
independence from the protector will be inclined to expend energy 
persuading the protector of the merits of the trustee’s decision.  That is, 
if the trustee concludes that its ultimate obligation is to the beneficiaries 
(or the settlor), the trustee will best promote the interests of the 
beneficiaries and settlor if it assures that the protector does not interfere 
with the trustee’s decisions.  That, in turn, diverts the trustee’s energies 
from its primary function: making appropriate investment and 
distribution decisions.75 
Third, appointment of a protector can lead to inefficient diffusion 
of responsibility, with the trustee expending less care in making 
investment and distribution decisions, expecting that the protector will 
review those decisions in any event.  (Conversely, the protector may 
rely on the trustee’s care and prudence in making the initial 
determination.) 
The extent to which the appointment of a protector threatens to 
reduce the quality of the trustee’s decisions varies with the powers 
accorded the protector.  The most obvious threat arises when the trust 
instrument gives the protector power to direct the trustee’s investment 
and/or distribution decisions.  Once the protector exercises that power, 
the trustee could reasonably conclude that the trustee’s duty is to follow 
the protector’s directions, not to exercise independent judgment about 
the wisdom of the protector’s decisions.76  The trustee might be 
especially inclined to follow the protector’s directions in cases where 
the protector has power to replace the trustee.  In effect, the trustee 
could behave as the protector’s agent, not as a watchdog for the interests 
of the beneficiaries.   
 
make the decision can generate perverse results.  See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The 
Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 107-09 (2004) 
(identifying the difficult tradeoffs between authority and accountability in the corporate setting). 
 75 For a similar point with regard to corporate decisionmakers, see Donald C. Langevoort, 
The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of 
Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 813 (2001) (observing that when more 
monitors of corporate CEOs are in place, CEOs spend more time influencing monitors and less 
time engaging in more productive tasks). 
 76 Indeed, if the settlor gives the protector power to direct investment decisions, the trustee 
will generally be obligated to follow those directions.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TRUSTS § 75 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005). 
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Even when the trust instrument limits the protector to veto power, 
the trustee might exercise less care than the trustee would otherwise 
exercise, expecting that a particularly imprudent decision would be 
vetoed by the protector, and that, in any event, the trustee could use the 
protector’s failure to veto as evidence of the prudence of the trustee’s 
initial decision. 
The danger that appointment of a protector will diminish the 
quality of the trustee’s decisions does not establish that protectors 
inevitably increase agency costs.  But the danger does have two 
significant implications.  First, settlors and their lawyers should take 
care, both in the selection of trustees and protectors, and in the 
allocation of power between trustees and protectors, to minimize the 
danger.  In many circumstances, appointment of a protector may prove 
unnecessary or counterproductive.77  Second, courts (and, perhaps, 
legislatures) should structure the legal incidents of the relationship 
between trustees and protectors with these agency costs in mind.  
Section IV focuses on that issue of doctrine. 
 
B.     The Trust Protector and the Settlor’s Foresight 
 
A trust settlor might appoint a trust protector to perform functions 
entirely unrelated to monitoring the trustee’s performance.  For 
instance, the settlor might confer on a protector the power to modify or 
terminate the trust, to change the trust’s situs, or to make discretionary 
distributions to particular beneficiaries.  The settlor might name a 
protector with these powers for the same reason a settlor might create a 
power of appointment: to assure that the trust is responsive to 
information not available to the settlor at the time the settlor creates the 
trust. 
The settlor, for instance, will not be in a position to foresee the 
details of tax law changes that might make continuation of the trust on 
its current terms superfluous or even counterproductive.  Nor can the 
settlor anticipate changes in state law—perhaps with respect to creditor 
claims or trust duration—that might make it desirable to change the 
trust’s location. 
A settlor’s imperfect foresight extends beyond changes in law.  
Trust assets could change significantly in value after creation of the 
trust, in ways that would alter the settlor’s distributional preferences, or 
even, in some circumstances, lead to termination of the trust.  The 
circumstances of the trust beneficiaries might also change in ways that 
 
 77 Cf. Waters, supra note 22, at 105 (noting that settlors might reasonably fear that 
appointment of a protector would “add one more layer of costs and bureaucracy”). 
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would alter the settlor’s preferred distribution.  If, for instance, the 
settlor created a generation-skipping trust on the assumption that 
settlor’s children would be sufficiently wealthy to benefit from the trust, 
the settlor’s preferences might change markedly if one or more of 
settlor’s children were to encounter financial setbacks.  The tax 
advantages associated with the generation-skipping transfer tax 
exemption would then fade in importance. 
To account for changes like these, the settlor could include in the 
trust instrument first, a statement of the trust’s purposes, and second, an 
authorization for one or more trust beneficiaries to petition for judicial 
modification or termination of the trust if the terms of the trust no 
longer serve those purposes.78  But that approach entails significant 
legal costs, and also reposes in courts judgment calls that the settlor 
might rather repose in a trust protector—someone who might be closer 
to the family, or someone with more tax or financial expertise. 
When a settlor appoints a protector to compensate for his lack of 
foresight, the issue is not whether the protector will effectively monitor 
the trustee’s performance; the protector’s responsibilities are 
independent of the trustee’s actions.  Instead, from an agency cost 
perspective, the issue is how best to assure that the protector will act as 
a faithful agent.  In the first instance, that is an issue for the settlor and 
the settlor’s lawyers in drafting the trust instrument.  But legal doctrine 
also has a role to play in minimizing agency costs.   
 
III.     SHAPING DOCTRINE 
A.     Introduction 
 
The trust instrument itself provides a starting point for determining 
the legal liabilities of the trust protector.  Indeed, it would be reasonable 
to start with the assumption that the judicial role in regulating trust 
protectors should be the role specified by the settlor in the trust 
instrument.  That is, the protector’s liabilities are largely a matter of 
contract, capable of careful articulation in the trust instrument.  But 
many trust instruments are silent, or incomplete, about the liabilities of 
the protector.79  Moreover, even if a trust instrument were to include 
language purporting to determine the protector’s liabilities, there is 
 
 78 Cf. id. at 666 (noting that in the trust context, “using courts to provide flexibility is 
marginal”); Rock & Wachter, supra note 23, at 664 (discussing possibility of judicial 
reformation). 
 79 See Duckworth, supra note 12, at 174 (noting that it is “not the usual practice for the trust 
instrument to lay down comprehensive rules”). 
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good reason to believe, in light of the limited experience with trust 
protectors, that neither the settlor nor the settlor’s lawyer will have fully 
anticipated the range of issues that might arise in conjunction with the 
protector’s action and inaction.  As a result, courts will inevitably 
develop a set of default rules to deal with trust protectors, and those 
rules may sometimes take on a “mandatory” character, displacing 
explicit instructions in the trust instrument.  My objective in this section 
is to offer a tentative sketch of the legal regime that should surround 
trust protectors, drawing both on agency cost concepts, and on existing 
fiduciary duty law. 
As we have seen, the protector’s role with respect to management 
issues differs significantly from its role with respect to distribution 
issues.  The trustee is the primary manager of the trust assets, and the 
protector’s role is primarily that of a monitor.  By contrast, when the 
trust instrument confers on the protector the power to alter the trust’s 
distribution scheme, the protector becomes the primary decisionmaker, 
not a monitor of trustee behavior.  This difference has implications for 
the legal framework surrounding the two issues, and suggests that the 
two sets of issues should be discussed separately. 
 
B.     The Protector’s Power with Respect to Management Issues 
1.     The Analytical Framework 
 
Trust instruments frequently give trust protectors the power to 
direct or veto portfolio management decisions made by the trustee.  Any 
evaluation of the protector’s legal responsibilities with respect to these 
powers requires attention to two separate but related questions: first, 
how should an appropriately responsive protector behave with respect to 
the power conferred on him by the trust instrument; and second, what 
legal liabilities will induce the appropriate behavior?  In familiar terms, 
these questions reduce to what standard of behavior the protector should 
employ, and what standard of review of the protector’s actions will 
induce that standard of behavior.80 
Consider first the standard of behavior.  With respect to 
management issues, the settlor’s primary concern will generally be to 
provide maximum return to the trust beneficiaries.  Thus, on 
management issues, where the settlor’s interests and those of the 
beneficiaries are closely aligned, the legal framework should generally 
 
 80 Cf. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of 
Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437 (1993) (examining policies behind 
divergent standards of conduct and review in corporate cases). 
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aim to have the protector behave as the settlor would want the protector 
to behave.81 
How would the typical settlor want the protector to behave with 
respect to the powers the settlor has conferred upon the protector?  A 
first possibility is that the settlor wants the protector to act as a trustee 
would act, scrutinizing each investment decision as if the protector were 
the primary decisionmaker, doing the research necessary to identify the 
most prudent decision and then exercising the protector’s powers to 
assure that the trustee or trustees make that decision.  A second, polar 
opposite, possibility is that the settlor had no expectations of the 
protector; that the settlor wanted the protector to have complete freedom 
to act, or not to act, to suit the protector’s pleasure.  A third alternative 
is that the settlor wanted the protector to defer to the trustee’s decisions, 
even when the protector disagreed with those decisions, acting only 
when the trustee’s decision amounted to an abuse of discretion, or 
exceeded the bound of reasonableness, or some comparable standard.  
That is, the settlor might have wanted the protector to act only in those 
situations in which, absent a protector, a court would intervene to 
protect trust beneficiaries. 
If the typical settlor would opt for the first standard of behavior—
the protector acts as a trustee would act—determining the standard of 
review would be easy: use the same standard applied to review trustee 
decisions.  When the issue relates to the trustee’s duty to invest 
prudently, courts typically intervene only when the trustee has abused 
its discretion.82  That abuse of discretion standard is designed to 
preserve primary decisionmaking responsibility in the trustee, not the 
 
 81 There may, of course, be cases in which the trust settlor has a strong, but idiosyncratic, 
belief that a particular investment strategy is in the interest of the trust beneficiaries, or that the 
trustee should pursue a particular strategy even if it is not in the interest of the beneficiaries.  The 
classic case is In re Pulitzer’s Estate, 249 N.Y.S. 87 (Sur. Ct. 1931), in which Joseph Pulitzer 
directed that the trustee not have the power to sell shares in his newspaper corporation.  These are 
cases, however, in which the settlor is likely to provide express and clear instructions in the trust 
instrument rather than entrusting enforcement of his wishes to a trust protector. 
  Suppose, however, the settlor were to include such directions and empower the protector to 
enforce them.  Doctrinal limitations on dead-hand control prevent the settlor, as principal, from 
imposing particular restrictions on one form of agent (the trustee).  See generally John H. 
Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1105, 1118-19 (2004).  
There would seem to be little reason, then, to suggest that the protector—another form of agent 
—should have more power than the principal to evade these limits on dead-hand control. 
  Moreover, any attempt by the protector to enforce the settlor’s directions would be met 
with litigation by the trustee, concerned about the trustee’s own liability for causing depletion of 
trust assets.  If the result of such litigation would be to require that the trustee ignore the settlor’s 
instructions (and those of the protector), then the protector would have served no purpose by 
seeking to enforce the restrictions.  In that circumstance, it would appear peculiar to assume that  
the settlor would have wanted the protector to take futile actions. 
 82 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 87 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005). 
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reviewing court, while nevertheless holding the trustee accountable for 
its decisions.83 
If the typical settlor would opt for the second standard of 
behavior—the protector acts at the protector’s pleasure—determining 
the standard of review would also be easy: relieve the protector from all 
fiduciary duty, and insulate the protector from suit altogether. 
Assuming that the settlor would opt for the first standard of 
behavior, however, is inconsistent with the settlor’s decision to appoint 
a protector rather than a co-trustee.  If the settlor had wanted the 
protector to duplicate the behavior of a trustee, the settlor would have 
named the protector a trustee. 
More plausible, in at least some circumstances, is the assumption 
that the settlor would opt for the second standard of behavior—the 
protector acts at his pleasure.  Settlor might so indicate in the trust 
instrument.84  Or, even without an express indication in the trust 
instrument, the relationship of the settlor and the beneficiary may make 
it clear that settlor was prepared to repose complete confidence in the 
protector.85  Alternatively, the rights conferred on the protector may 
make it clear that settlor intended to enable the protector to act purely 
out of self-interest—as where the protector is the trust’s principal 
beneficiary.86 
In these circumstances, determining the appropriate standard of 
review is also easy: courts should not intervene to reverse any action or 
inaction by the protector, and should not impose liability on the 
protector for action or inaction.  Put in other terms, the court should 
conclude that the protector is not accountable to the trust beneficiaries 
for his actions; the protector is not bound by fiduciary duties.87 
 In most circumstances, however, this second assumption—that 
the settlor intended for the protector to act, or not act, without regard to 
the settlor’s purposes—is as implausible as the assumption that the 
 
 83 See id. at cmt. b (“[J]udicial intervention is not warranted merely because the court would 
have differently exercised the discretion.”); cf. Julian Velasco, Structural Bias and the Need for 
Substantive Review, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 821, 834 (2004) (noting comparable reasons for the 
business judgment rule in the corporate context: “litigation on substantive decisions, and even on 
duty of care issues, would be about matters on which reasonable people would disagree. . . .  
[N]either judges nor shareholders are likely to be capable of making better decisions than the 
professionals charged with running the business.”). 
 84 Cf. Bove, supra note 27, at 392-93. 
 85 Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 75 cmt. c(1) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (power 
given to settlor’s widow or widower to prevent sale of residential property held in the trust by 
refusing to consent to its sale would presumptively be a power for the benefit of the occupant-
power holder, and thus not a power held in a fiduciary capacity). 
 86 See Bove, supra note 27, at 392-93. 
 87 The settlor will often want to avoid this conclusion in order to assure that the protector 
does not hold a general power of appointment, which could generate adverse tax consequences.  
See id. at 395. 
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settlor intended the protector to be an additional trustee.  Taken to its 
extreme, such an assumption could leave the protector as a principal 
beneficiary of the trust: the protector could agree to exercise his powers 
in accordance with the preferences of the highest bidder.  Even if a 
settlor were prepared to endorse such behavior with the initial hand-
picked protector, it is difficult to attribute to the settlor assumption of 
such a risk with any successor protector. 
In most circumstances, therefore, the most likely alternative is that 
the settlor intends for the protector to defer to the trustee’s judgment 
most of the time.  The settlor reposes in the protector powers that 
constrain the trustee’s management decisions not because the settlor 
expects the protector to exercise those powers, but because the existence 
of those powers will increase the trustee’s responsiveness to the 
interests of the trust beneficiaries (and ultimately to the settlor’s 
wishes).  Typically, the settlor is not attempting to shift all 
decisionmaking responsibility from the trustee to the protector; such a 
shift would simply replicate the agency costs in a traditional trust that 
has no protector.  Instead, the settlor presumably expects the protector 
to monitor trustee behavior without displacing the discretion ordinarily 
reposed in the trustee—the person or institution selected by the settlor to 
manage the trust assets.  That is, the settlor expects the protector to 
assume a monitoring role comparable to the role a court might play, 
absent the attendant litigation costs.  Accordingly, the settlor expects the 
protector to intervene only when the trustee has abused its discretion. 
The question, then, is how to structure the legal liabilities of trustee and 
protector to minimize the sum of agency and monitoring costs. 
Unfortunately, the standards for judicial review of the protector’s 
actions that flow from this assumption about the preferred standard of 
protector behavior are not self-evident.  Absolving the protector of legal 
accountability for his actions—based on the assumption that settlors 
typically appoint protectors to avoid the costs associated with judicial 
enforcement of a trustee’s fiduciary duties—provides the protector with 
license to act in ways that are contrary to the settlor’s wishes and the 
beneficiaries’ interests.88  As we have seen, the no accountability 
 
 88 Moreover, it is not clear that such a regime would ultimately avoid litigation costs.  
Whenever the protector’s instruction appears sufficiently inimical to the interests of the trust 
beneficiaries, the trustee would have an incentive to seek judicial instructions in order to avoid 
the trustee’s own liability for following the protector’s instructions. 
  A trustee is entitled to seek instructions whenever he has reasonable doubt regarding any 
matter relating to administration of the trust.  See Adler v. Adler, 713 N.E.2d 348 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1999).  These matters can include the construction of the trust instrument, the extent of the 
trustee’s duties or powers, the identity and interests of the beneficiaries, or the resolution of a 
dispute among beneficiaries.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 71 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 
2005); Patterson v. Polk, 317 S.W.2d 286 (Ark. 1958); Lowe v. Johnson, 469 N.E.2d 768 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1984); In re Merlin A. Abadie Inter Vivos Trust, 791 So. 2d 181 (La. Ct. App. 2001).  A 
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standard is the appropriate standard of review when the settlor expects 
the protector to act in the protector’s own self-interest.  But a standard 
of review that holds the protector liable when he has not acted with the 
care, skill, and caution the law normally demands of trustees effectively 
induces the protector to intervene in every trust decision, not to act as a 
monitor of trustee behavior.89 
To induce protectors to function as settlors intend them to 
function—as monitors of trustee behavior—trust law must devise and 
apply a more deferential standard of review than that applied to trustees.  
The precise standard will differ depending on the powers the settlor has 
conferred on the protector.  What is critical to recognize, however, is 
that routine transplantation to protectors of the fiduciary standards 
applied to trustees would represent an analytical error.90  To the extent 
settlors expect protectors to play a role distinct from trustees, the 
standard of review applied to the protector’s actions must reflect that 
distinction. 
 
2.     Requirements that the Trustee Secure Protector’s Consent 
 
Consider first the trust settlor who seeks to constrain the trustee’s 
power by requiring the trustee to obtain the protector’s consent before 
taking specified actions.  For instance, the trust instrument might 
require the trustee to obtain the protector’s consent before changing the 
trust’s investment portfolio.  Or, the trust instrument might require the 
protector’s consent before the trustee engages in a more limited set of 
transactions, such as the sale of shares of a closely-held corporation in 
 
trustee’s ignorance of the terms of the trust will not shield him from liability for breach of duty 
when he fails to seek instructions.  See In re Marriage of Petrie, 19 P.3d 443 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2001).  However, in the absence of fraud or concealment, seeking instructions demonstrates good 
faith on the part of the trustee and shields him from liability.  See In re Riordan’s Trusteeship, 
248 N.W. 21 (Iowa 1933); Willis v. Braucher, 87 N.E. 185 (Ohio 1909). 
 89 Professors Johnson and Millon have recently argued that, in the corporate context, 
fiduciary duty standards for corporate officers should be more stringent than those applied to 
corporate directors.  Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers are 
Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597 (2005).  They argue, in particular, that corporate 
officers—the corporation’s primary decisionmakers—should be liable for ordinary negligence, 
while corporate directors should face a looser “gross negligence” standard.  Id. at 1630-31.  They 
justify this distinction by noting that “officers bear primary responsibility for stewardship of the 
corporation’s business activities,” while the board or directors, “meeting only occasionally and 
lacking intimate knowledge of the corporation’s activities, is incapable of managing the publicly 
held corporation in a direct manner.”  Id. at 1637-38.  That is, they see the standard of review 
designed for optimal monitoring as different from the standard appropriate for primary 
management activity. 
 90 Cf. id. at 1600-01 (decrying the failure of courts and commentators to distinguish between 
duties of officers and those of directors, despite significant differences in institutional function). 
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which the settlor was a principal.  In these cases, the settlor might be 
relying on the protector’s investment expertise. 
In other cases, the settlor might authorize the trustee to engage in 
self-dealing transactions, but only with the protector’s consent.  Or the 
settlor might require the protector’s consent before the trustee could 
make particular distributions of income or principal.  In each of these 
situations, the settlor’s appointment of the protector avoids the need for 
judicial monitoring of the trustee’s actions, and hence has the potential 
to reduce agency costs. 
When the settlor conditions the trustee’s power to act on obtaining 
the protector’s consent, the protector’s position most closely resembles 
that of a co-trustee.91  In both situations, the settlor is unwilling to 
repose all responsibility for management of trust assets in a single 
person or entity, and requires a single trustee to persuade another 
party—either a co-trustee or a protector—before taking a significant 
action with respect to trust assets.  From a standard of behavior 
perspective, the settlor expects the protector to evaluate the trustee’s 
proposed action with the care ordinarily expected of a trustee; the settlor 
does not contemplate inaction or deference by the protector.  The 
protector’s inaction would paralyze the trust.  To take an extreme case, 
suppose the protector simply refused to respond to all requests by the 
trustee.92  It appears inconceivable that the settlor intended to relegate 
the trustee to seeking judicial approval of its actions—especially when 
the principal reason for appointing the protector is to avoid the 
monitoring costs associated with judicial review.93 
Conversely, the settlor does not expect the protector to act as a 
rubber stamp on decisions made by the trustee.  When the settlor 
requires the trustee to seek explicit approval from the protector, the 
settlor typically expects the protector to exercise his best judgment in 
evaluating the trustee’s recommendation.94  That is, the settlor expects 
the protector to act with the prudence required of a co-trustee.  And 
when the settlor appoints co-trustees, both the standard of behavior and 
the standard of review are well-established, subject to express 
provisions in the trust instrument relieving one or more of the trustees 
from responsibility for particular actions.95  A comparable legal regime 
 
 91 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 75 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (If the 
terms of the trust do not permit the trustee to act without the direction or consent of the fiduciary 
power holder, the “designated person’s fiduciary duties and liabilities with respect to the power 
are generally comparable to those of a trustee.”). 
 92 Duckworth, supra note 12, at 249. 
 93 Id. at 178. 
 94 Cf. 2A SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 28, § 185 (The power holder abuses discretion if, “in 
exercising or failing to exercise the power he acts dishonestly or from an improper motive or fails 
to use his judgment or acts beyond the  bounds of reasonable judgment.”). 
 95 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 81 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (“When a 
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appears appropriate for trust protectors: when the instrument conditions 
the trustee’s power to act on the consent of the protector, the protector 
must act with prudence in giving or withholding consent, and must act 
not out of self-interest, but instead in the interest of the trust 
beneficiaries.  Moreover, the protector’s duties should expose the 
protector to parallel liabilities for consenting and for failing to 
consent.96  The settlor who requires the protector’s consent expects an 
exercise of judgment; a failure to exercise that judgment with prudence 
and loyalty exposes the protector to liability whether the protector has 
followed a course of action or a course of inaction.97 
 
 
3.     The Protector’s Power to Initiate Action 
 
Rather than requiring the protector to approve or disapprove 
actions taken by the trustee, the trust instrument might confer on the 
protector power to initiate action with respect to trust management.  In 
this situation, unlike the situation in which the settlor has required the 
trustee to obtain the protector’s consent before acting, the settlor has 
conferred on the protector discretion to act, or not to act.98  Although the 
protector has fiduciary duties in either instance, the standard of review 
applied to the protector’s failure to act should differ significantly from 
the standard applied when the protector initiates a self-interested or 
imprudent action.99 
 
trust has multiple trustees, the fiduciary duties of trustees stated in this Chapter, except as 
modified by the terms of the trust, apply to each of the trustees.”); Waters, supra note 22, at 72, 
84; 2A SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 12, § 185. 
 96 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 75 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (Power 
holder whose consent is a predicate for trustee action is liable for losses to the trust as a result of 
the power holder’s breach of fiduciary duty “whether as a result of improper exercise of the 
power or improper failure to exercise it.”). 
 97 Cf. Sherry v. Little, 167 N.E.2d 872 (Mass. 1960). 
 98 Sometimes, the protector’s position may be a hybrid, imposing on the protector no explicit 
obligation to approve or direct investments, but providing that the trustee cannot take action 
without the protector’s approval.  See Duckworth, supra note 12, at 253 (Example 2). 
 99 The Restatement endorses a differential standard for the protector’s actions and failures to 
act, but offers a somewhat different formulation: 
If the terms of the power merely authorize the designated person to direct a trustee who 
is otherwise under a duty to proceed with the administration of the trust so long as the 
power is not exercised, ordinarily the only duty of the power holder is not to exercise 
the power in a manner inconsistent with the fiduciary duties owed to one or more of the 
beneficiaries. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 75 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005).  The Comment 
goes on to suggest, however, that the power holder may have an affirmative duty to act “when the 
power holder knows or should know that the purposes of the power call for some action to be 
taken.”  Id. 
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a.     The Protector’s Failure to Act 
 
When the trustee may not act without the protector’s approval, the 
protector’s inaction has the potential to paralyze trust administration.  
By contrast, when the trust instrument confers on the protector the 
power to initiate actions, the protector’s failure to exercise that power 
will not prevent the trustee from administering the trust.100  The trustee 
can continue to make decisions about investments and distributions 
without securing approval from the protector. 
Suppose, for instance, the trust instrument gives the protector 
power to require the trustee to make particular investments, or power to 
remove the trustee.  The settlor does not expect the protector to exercise 
these powers, unless unanticipated circumstances arise.  If the trustee 
acts prudently and loyally, the protector will never have occasion to 
exercise these powers.  Suppose, however, the trustee acts disloyally or 
imprudently.  What are the trust protector’s responsibilities? 
First, how much investigation into the trustee’s actions is the 
protector obligated to conduct?  The settlor might reasonably expect the 
protector to know the content of the trust portfolio, but it is unlikely that 
the settlor expects the protector to make efforts to determine the 
marketability of assets held by the trust in order to assure adequate 
diversification.  Nor is it likely that the settlor expects the protector to 
familiarize himself with the trustee’s personal portfolio to determine 
whether the trustee has engaged in self-dealing.101 
Second, even if the protector believes that the trustee has made an 
unreasonable investment decision, it is not clear that the settlor would 
want the protector to direct the trustee to reverse that decision.  Imagine 
a trustee who has sold trust property to himself as an individual, or to an 
entity in which the trustee holds a financial interest.  Assume further 
 
 100 The Restatement distinguishes between these two situations in Comment f, where one 
paragraph deals with cases in which “the terms of the trust do not permit the trustee to act without 
the direction or consent of” the power holder, and the following paragraph deals with a trust in 
which “the terms of the power merely authorize the designated person to direct a trustee who is 
otherwise under a duty to proceed with the administration of the trust so long as the power is not 
exercised. . . .”  Id. 
 101 Nor is the trustee likely to inform the protector of such self-dealing unless the trustee 
believes that the protector will approve the self-dealing and insulate the protector from liability.  
Consider also, in the corporate context, Professor Eisenberg’s observation that 
in those cases in which the board is called upon to approve a self-interested transaction 
involving principal senior executives, the board’s sole source of advice may be the 
proponent of the transaction.  In short, unlike the typical business decision, in 
determining whether to approve a self-interested transaction involving principal senior 
executives, disinterested directors may receive only self-interested advice. 
Eisenberg, supra note 80, at 453. 
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that the protector knows of the trustee’s self-dealing, but believes that 
the trustee has paid the trust an adequate price for the property.102  Or, 
imagine a trustee who has retained in the trust portfolio a heavy 
concentration of real estate previously owned by the settlor, or of stock 
in a few closely-held corporations.103  The protector believes that the 
trustee has retained these assets for longer than reasonably necessary, 
and that as a result, the trust portfolio is not adequately diversified.  In 
these hypothetical situations, the protector knows of the trustee’s 
breach, or has reason to suspect breach, and has power to act, either by 
removing the trustee or by directing the trustee to make other 
investment decisions.  In each case, however, the settlor might prefer 
that the protector refrain from acting. 
The protector may have reasons—rooted in the beneficiaries’ best 
interests—for deferring to the trustee’s decision even if the protector 
believes that those decisions reflect a breach of fiduciary duty.  
Especially if the trustee is solvent, the protector may conclude that the 
beneficiaries will be better off as a result of the trustee’s decision.  The 
protector (like the settlor) may have confidence in the trustee’s 
investment instincts, however inconsistent with modern portfolio 
theory, and may conclude that allowing the trustee’s decision to stand 
will leave the beneficiaries better off: if the trustee’s instincts pay off, 
the beneficiaries profit, while if they do not, the trustee is liable for 
breach.  The trustee’s liability itself is a mechanism for diversifying the 
beneficiaries’ risks. 
In some ways, the protector’s position is akin to that of a reviewing 
court facing a challenge to the action of a corporate officer or director.  
The officers and directors have primary responsibility for running the 
corporation, and courts are loathe to interfere with their business 
judgments even if those judgments appear—from the court’s 
perspective—to be unreasonable.104  As a result, courts apply the 
 
 102 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt b. (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) 
(“[U]nder the so-called ‘no-further inquiry’ principle it is immaterial that the trustee may be able 
to show that the action in question was taken in good faith, that the terms of the transaction were 
fair, and that no profit resulted to the trustee.”). 
 103 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227(b) (1992) (embracing duty to diversify); id. 
§ 229 (setting forth duty, within reasonable time, to make and implement decisions concerning 
retention and disposition of original assets to comply with duties in sections 227 and 228). 
 104 There are a number of reasons for this reluctance—first, “it may be hard for judges to 
differentiate bad business decisions from good business decisions that turn out badly.”  William 
T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Realigning the Standard of Review of Director Due 
Care with Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and its Progeny as a Standard of 
Review Problem, 96 NW. U. L. REV 449, 454 (2002).  Second, judges and other decisionmakers 
may have a “hindsight bias” that might lead to imposition of liability even when none is 
warranted.  Id. at 455.  Third, interference with business judgments on an ordinary negligence 
standard would lead to excessive risk aversion by corporate officials.  Id.  Ultimately, the result 
might be reluctance to serve as a director.  Id.; see also Velasco, supra note 83, at 833-34; Rock 
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business judgment rule and defer to those decisions without an inquiry 
into their reasonableness.105  In effect, courts abstain from deciding 
whether the decisions are reasonable in order to preserve the decision-
making authority of the corporation’s primary decision makers.106 
The analogy, of course, is less than perfect; significant differences 
exist between trustees and corporate officers.107  In particular, while 
decisions made by corporate officers are often sui generis,108 protocols 
exist—no self-dealing, diversification of portfolio—by which protectors 
can measure trustee behavior.  In addition, corporate officers and 
directors are subject to market monitoring not typically available with 
respect to trustees.109 
Nevertheless, it remains true that if the protector has a 
responsibility to act whenever the protector concludes that an actual or 
prospective decision of the trustee would be inconsistent with the 
interests of the beneficiaries, the protector is in effect assuming the 
primary decisionmaking responsibility for the trust.  The trustee knows 
that the protector will exercise its powers whenever the trustee does not 
anticipate the protector’s preferences.  As a result, the trustee has every 
incentive to seek the protector’s blessing before making any decision, 
effectively ceding any discretion the trust instrument conferred upon the 
trustee, and ignoring the interests of the trust beneficiaries.  The 
protector effectively becomes a replacement for the trustee rather than a 
monitor of trustee behavior.  The result is to make the protector an 
additional intermediary who adds little value; on the contrary, if the 
settlor chose the trustee because the settlor valued the trustee’s 
investment and administrative skills, substituting the protector for the 
trustee might reduce the trust’s value to the settlor and the beneficiaries. 
 
& Wachter, supra note 23, at 667-68.  For the suggestion that these reasons apply with lesser 
force to officers than to directors, see Johnson & Millon, supra note 89, at 1642. 
 105 See generally Eisenberg, supra note 80, at 443 (Under a business judgment standard, “a 
director or officer will not be liable for a decision that resulted in a loss to the corporation, even if 
the decision is unreasonable.”); Bainbridge, supra note 74, at 108 (The business judgment rule 
“protect[s] those who make errors of judgment, even when those errors rise to the level of 
negligence”). 
 106 See Bainbridge, supra note 74, at 108 (stating that the business judgment rule is justified 
because judicial review threatens free exercise of managerial power). 
 107 See generally Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Capital Market 
Efficiency, 28 J. CORP. L. 565, 577 (2003); Leslie, supra note 3, at 77-88; Rock & Wachter, supra 
note 23, at 664-68. 
 108 See Eisenberg, supra note 80, at 444 (noting that because business decisions are unique, 
corporate decisionmakers can rarely shield themselves by showing that they followed accepted 
protocols or practices). 
 109 Compare Bainbridge, supra note 74, at 122 (noting that “[m]arket forces work an imperfect 
Darwinian selection on corporate decision makers”), and Macey, supra note 35, at 317-20, with 
Leslie, supra note 3, at 77-88, and Sitkoff, supra note 107, at 677-78. 
  
2006] TRUST PROTECTORS  2791 
 
From an agency cost perspective, it is difficult to imagine that a 
typical settlor would want such an activist protector.  If the settlor did 
want such an activist protector, the settlor would be more likely to 
prohibit the trustee from acting without the protector’s consent, or to 
make the protector a co-trustee.  A better assumption is that the typical 
settlor wants the protector to intervene only in cases where the protector 
can discern no rational basis for the trustee’s action.110 
This assumption about appropriate protector behavior leads to a 
deferential standard of review of the protector’s decision not to act: the 
protector should be liable for breach by failing to act only if the 
protector has made no reasonable inquiry into the trustee’s behavior111 
or if no reasonable person would fail to act on the facts available to the 
protector.112  So long as protector can establish a reasonable basis for 
failing to act—and deference to the judgment of the trustee will qualify 
as such a reasonable basis, unless that judgment is plainly inconsistent 
with the interests of the trust beneficiaries—the protector’s failure to act 
should not subject the protector to liability.113 
 
b.     The Protector’s Actions 
 
Unlike the protector who fails to act, a protector who exercises a 
power conferred on him by the trust instrument takes affirmative 
responsibility for managing some aspect of the trust.  It would be 
peculiar to assume that a settlor would expect that a protector who takes 
on that responsibility would exercise less prudence than other 
fiduciaries in discharging management functions.  That is, if a protector 
directs a trustee to make particular investments, the typical settlor would 
expect that the protector’s behavior would be governed by the duties of 
 
 110 Cf. Eisenberg, supra note 80, at 442 (noting that even the business judgment rule requires 
that the decision be rational, even if unreasonable). 
 111 To assert the protection of rules designed to protect the exercise of judgment, 
decisionmakers generally have to show that they have exercised that judgment by making a 
conscious decision based on a reasonable inquiry.  See Eisenberg, supra note 80, at 441 (“[A] 
director’s failure to make due inquiry, or any other simple failure to take action—as opposed to a 
decision not to act—does not qualify for the protection of the [business judgment] rule.”); 
Bainbridge, supra note 74, at 99 (“[Directors] may only invoke the business judgment rule when 
they have made a conscious decision.”). 
 112 Some commentators have described the business judgment review standard as one that 
examines decisionmaker actions for “rationality” rather than “reasonableness”; for them, an 
irrational decision is “one that is so blatantly imprudent that it is inexplicable, in the sense that no 
well-motivated and minimally informed person could have made it.”  Allen, Jacobs & Strine, 
supra note 104, at 452. 
 113 Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 75 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (“[T]here 
may be an affirmative duty to act when the power holder knows or should know that the purposes 
of the power call for some action to be taken.”). 
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care, loyalty, and impartiality that would constrain a trustee.114  And if 
the standard of behavior expected of protectors who exercise 
management responsibility is the same as the standard expected of 
trustees, courts have strong reasons to apply the same standard of 
review: that is, the protector should be liable for the same behavior that 
would generate liability in trustees.115 
Sometimes, the management responsibilities assumed by the 
protector will have direct analogues to responsibilities typically borne 
by trustees—as when the protector directs the trustee to make particular 
investments, or when the protector exercises discretion in directing the 
distribution of trust assets.  With respect to these decisions, the 
protector’s behavior should be governed by the duties of care, loyalty, 
and impartiality that would constrain a trustee.116 
At other times, the protector will act in a way that is not directly 
analogous to any action a trustee might take.  In these instances, too, the 
protector bears fiduciary responsibilities, but precedent from existing 
trust law is less likely to be helpful in defining those responsibilities.  
Consider, for instance, the protector who removes an existing trustee.117  
That removal necessarily imposes costs on the trust—as for the 
accounting necessary to resolve the respective liabilities of the old and 
new trustees.  The protector should be obligated to explain why 
incurring these costs was in the interest of the trust beneficiaries; if the 
protector cannot offer a plausible explanation, the protector has 
breached its duty to those beneficiaries.118 
One might object that this regime—limited accountability for the 
protector’s failure to act; fiduciary liability for actions taken by the 
protector—will skew the protector’s incentives towards inaction.  From 
an agency cost perspective, however, this system of skewed incentives 
is a plus, not a minus.  The tension between authority and accountability 
is central to every agency relationship.  A settlor’s objective in using a 
trust protector is to make the trustee more accountable without 
removing from the trustee the authority to act in areas where the trustee 
has presumed expertise.  A regime in which the protector generally 
defers to the trustee’s decisions, intervening only in extraordinary 
circumstances, has the potential to advance the settlor’s objectives 
better than a regime in which the protector has incentives to intervene in 
day-to-day management.  Imposing fiduciary duties on the protector 
 
 114 See 2A SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 28, § 185. 
 115 Cf. Warner v. First Nat’l Bank, 236 F.2d 853, 858 (8th Cir. 1956) (holding that managing 
advisor to executors was not himself a trustee, but might be liable for giving  fraudulent or 
careless advice). 
 116 See 2A SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 28, § 185 (4th ed. 2001). 
 117 See, e.g., Von Knierem v. Bermuda Trust Co., Ltd., [1995] S.C.B. 154. 
 118 See id.; see also Duckworth, supra note 12, at 251 (Example 1). 
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when the protector exercises its power reduces threats to the trustee’s 
authority.  By contrast, imposing fiduciary duties on the trustee when 
the protector fails to act would introduce increased protector 
intervention, and a corresponding reduction of the trustee’s authority.  
At the same time, the knowledge that the protector has power to 
intervene, even if the protector has limited financial incentive to do so, 
supplements the prospect of fiduciary duty liability as a mechanism for 
holding the trustee accountable. 
 
4.     Protector Self-Dealing 
 
So far, the discussion has focused on providing incentives to 
induce the protector to engage in appropriate monitoring of trustee 
behavior.  But what of the protector who uses his power to engage in 
self-dealing.  That is, suppose the protector “consents” to a trustee 
decision to invest trust assets in an enterprise in which the protector has 
an interest, or suppose the protector directs the trustee to make such an 
investment.  The approach to these issues should generally be obvious: 
absent language or circumstances suggesting the contrary, there is little 
reason to believe that the settlor was more willing to permit self-dealing 
by the protector than by the trustee.  Hence, the protector’s liability for 
losses due to affirmative actions taken by the protector in which the 
protector stands to benefit personally should be comparable to trustee 
liability. 
A somewhat more difficult question arises when the trustee 
proposes a trust investment that stands to benefit the protector, and the 
protector has power to veto that decision, but does not do so.  One 
might conclude that the trustee’s judgment about the propriety of the 
investment should insulate the protector from liability.  That is, if the 
trustee, who has no personal interest, decides that the investment is a 
prudent one, the primary risk of self-dealing—the inability of the self-
dealer to separate his own interest from the trust’s interest—has been 
eliminated.  But that conclusion ignores an important fact: the trustee 
will often have an incentive to curry favor with the protector, who may 
have the power to veto the trustee’s decisions, or even to replace the 
trustee.119  Hence, a trustee may not exercise dispassionate review of 
investments that generate benefit for the trust protector.  As a result, the 
protector, like a trustee, should be required to veto such transactions, or 
to obtain court approval.  Of course, if the trust settlor reaches a 
 
 119 Cf. Johnson & Millon, supra note 89, at 1613-14 (discussing “cozy” relationship between 
boards of directors and senior officers that may impede monitoring of behavior by officers). 
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different conclusion, the settlor can draft the trust instrument 
accordingly. 
 
C.     Protector Powers Related to Trust Distribution Rather than 
Trust Management 
 
Consider now the protector whose powers do not extend to review 
of the trustee’s administration of the trust.  That is, suppose the 
protector’s powers relate largely to adjustments in the time and method 
of trust distribution.  Thus, to deal with the settlor’s inability to foresee 
future events, the settlor empowers the protector to modify the trust’s 
terms, or to terminate the trust, or to change the trust situs to better 
insulate trust assets from creditor claims.  Alternatively, the settlor 
empowers the protector to authorize distributions to particular trust 
beneficiaries if, in the protector’s judgment, circumstances warrant. 
Disputes are most likely to arise when action by the protector 
would have differential effects on the various trust beneficiaries, aiding 
some while harming others.  Thus, a protector’s decision to modify a 
generation-skipping trust to permit settlor’s impoverished child to reach 
trust principal would be of clear benefit to the child, but not to the 
settlor’s grandchildren.120  Similarly, a protector’s decision to move the 
trust’s situs to a jurisdiction that has abolished the Rule Against 
Perpetuities, and to modify the instrument to eliminate trust termination 
provisions might assist settlor’s remote descendants at the expense of 
living descendants who would prefer rapid distribution of trust 
principal. 
In situations like these, there is no readily available metric for 
evaluating the protector’s action or inaction.121  The warring 
beneficiaries may have disparate interests that are not amenable to easy 
aggregation.  Moreover, neither the protector nor a reviewing court will 
possess strong evidence of the settlor’s wishes; the settlor will typically 
 
 120 Typically, a generation-skipping trust would be drafted to preclude the settlor’s child from 
reaching the trust corpus.  If the child had an unlimited power to invade principal, the child would 
hold a general power of appointment over the trust property, and the property would be included 
within the child’s taxable estate under 26 U.S.C. § 2041 (2000), thus defeating the settlor’s 
original purpose. 
 121 A similar problem arises with respect to a trustee’s duty of impartiality, which is easy to 
state but difficult to define.  As the drafters of the Restatement have put it, “[i]t would be overly 
simplistic, and therefore misleading, to equate impartiality with some concept of ‘equality’ of 
treatment or concern—that is, to assume that the interests of all beneficiaries have the same 
priority and are entitled to the same weight in the trustee’s balancing of those interests.” 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 79 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005). 
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have appointed the protector precisely because the settlor could not 
anticipate the circumstances that have, in fact, unfolded.122 
Under these circumstances, close judicial scrutiny of the 
protector’s actions is likely to involve increased monitoring cost without 
a commensurate reduction in agency cost.  If courts deem the protector 
to have breached a duty of care or duty of impartiality whenever the 
court concludes that a different decision would have better served the 
aggregate interests of the trust beneficiaries, courts will encourage 
disappointed beneficiaries to litigate every adverse protector 
determination.123  Moreover, it is far from clear that the results reached 
by courts in those litigations would, on average, be superior to those 
reached by the protectors who made the initial decisions.124  After all, 
the settlor reposed his confidence in the protector, not in the reviewing 
court. 
At the same time, abandoning all judicial scrutiny over the 
protector’s decisions would leave protectors unduly free of ties to their 
principals.  Markets are unlikely to be effective in disciplining trust 
protectors; even if a class of professional protectors were to emerge, it 
would be difficult for settlors to identify which protectors had been 
most effective in making distribution decisions.125  Moral obligation 
would serve as the most significant constraint on protector behavior.  In 
general, law’s experience with other fiduciaries has been that moral 
obligation, often an essential component in guiding fiduciary 
behavior,126 is not by itself sufficient to generate optimal levels of care 
and loyalty.127 
 
 122 Cf. id. (“[I]t is often the case that the implications of the duty of impartiality are 
complicated by the difficulties of determining, and the vagueness of, some relevant aspects of the 
settlor’s intentions and objectives . . . .”). 
 123 Cf. Rock & Wachter, supra note 23, at 667 (noting, in the corporate context, that imposing 
close judicial scrutiny when judges cannot reliably distinguish between negligent and non-
negligent behavior “causes a host of problems”). 
 124 See id. at (noting as a justification of the business judgment rule that “courts with inferior 
information will do systematically worse than the internal governance mechanism in adjudicating 
the merits of a dispute”); cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 87 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 
2005) (“When a trustee has discretion with respect to the exercise of a power, its exercise is 
subject to supervision by a court only to prevent abuse of discretion.”). 
 125 Cf. Leslie, supra note 3, at 82-84 (detailing absence of market monitoring of trustee 
performance). 
 126 See generally Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
1253, 1256-66 (1999) (exploring obligational norms, and conceptualizing fiduciary duties as a 
form of obligational norms). 
 127 Indeed, the law of trusts developed in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries when the 
chancellor began to require the trustee—previously bound only by moral obligations—to act upon 
the dictates of his conscience.  See Richard H. Helmholz, The Early Enforcement of Uses, 79 
COLUM. L. REV. 1503, 1503 (1979). 
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The natural compromise is to subject protectors to judicial review, 
but to apply a deferential standard to the protector’s actions.128  Courts 
already apply such a standard to trustees of discretionary trusts.129  A 
protector with power to decide whether to make distributions of trust 
income or principal occupies essentially the same position, and should 
generally be subject to the same standard of review. 
Sometimes, however, the protector’s powers have no ready 
analogues in the realm of discretionary trusts.  The trustee of a 
discretionary trust, for instance, rarely has power to terminate or modify 
the trust, or to change its situs.  Nevertheless, the basic principle that 
remains is a similar one: a protector fulfills his legal duty to the 
beneficiaries when the protector identifies at least one trust purpose that 
would be advanced by the protector’s decision to exercise, or not to 
exercise, a non-management power conferred on him by the trust 
instrument, and when the protector’s decision was reasonably calculated 
to advance that purpose.130  Whether the protector should have 
advanced some other trust purpose, or chosen another course of action 
 
 128 Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 87 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (abuse of 
discretion standard applied to discretionary powers held by trustees). 
 129 When the trust instrument confers on the trustee broad discretion and does not constrain 
that discretion by reference to an external standard—such as support or maintenance of a 
particular beneficiary—courts typically sustain the trustee’s exercise of discretion so long as the 
trustee has a legitimate motive and no personal stake in the decision.  See, e.g., In re Trusts A & 
B, 672 N.W.2d 912, 919 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004); Bushong v. Castle, No. 98AP-29, 1998 WL 
767453 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 27, 1998) (sustaining trustee’s payment to life beneficiary with 
prepaid checks, even when trustee made no investigation of need, because there was no evidence 
of bad faith by the trustee); Strong v. Dann, 108 A. 86, 87 (N.J. Ch. 1919) (“[T]he court has no 
power to command or prohibit the exercise of the discretion confided to the trustee if his conduct 
be bona fide, and there is neither proof nor suggestion of mala fides in this case.”). 
  If the trustee of a discretionary trust refuses to consider a distribution decision suggested by 
a beneficiary, the trustee’s failure to exercise judgment may be an abuse, but even in that case, the 
court will not compel the trustee to make any payment; instead, the court may simply direct the 
trustee to exercise the judgment conferred on the trustee by the trust instrument.  See, e.g., Finch 
v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 577 S.E.2d 306 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (refusing to compel 
payment when trustee abused discretion by refusing to consider making payments to charity 
favored by trust beneficiary, and concluding that decision whether or not to make payment was 
within trustee’s discretion). 
  When the trust instrument constrains the trustee’s discretion by referring to an external 
standard, such as “reasonable maintenance, comfort and support” or procurement of “necessary 
and reasonable medical care,” courts are more likely to find an abuse of discretion when the 
trustee does not appear guided by that standard, even if the trust instrument purports to confer on 
the trustee “sole and uncontrolled discretion.”  See Marsman v. Nasca, 573 N.E.2d 1025 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 1991); First Nat’l Bank v. Howard, 229 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. 1950); see also Schofield v. 
Commerce Trust Co., 319 S.W.2d 275 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958) (finding it was an abuse of discretion 
not to make payments for son’s medical care when instrument authorized trustee to make 
payments “if necessary for upkeep of my son”). 
 130 A similar standard applies to a trustee’s exercise of broad discretionary powers in a 
discretionary trust.  So long as the trustee’s action is founded on a legitimate motive, and the 
trustee’s action is not tainted by self-interest, courts will not upset the trustee’s exercise of 
discretion.  See, e.g., In re Trusts A & B, 672 N.W.2d at 919. 
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that would have better advanced the protector’s chosen purpose, should 
be beyond the scope of judicial review.  What the settlor expects from 
the protector is a reasonable exercise of judgment;131 if doctrine expects 
much more, protectors may become difficult to find.132 
 
D.     Remedies for Breach by the Protector 
 
Suppose imposing fiduciary duties on trust protectors is necessary 
to minimize agency costs.  What recourse do the trustee or the 
beneficiaries have for breach of those duties?  First, and most obviously, 
the beneficiaries have a claim against the protector for losses suffered  
as a result of the protector’s breach.133  Without a personal claim against 
the protector, the protector has little financial incentive to avoid self-
dealing or other misconduct, and litigation would serve as an ineffective 
tool for monitoring the protector’s behavior.  But damage actions 
against the protector do not exhaust the potential remedies available to 
the trustee and the beneficiaries. 
Consider the case in which the trustee and the protector are at odds.  
Either the trustee needs the protector’s consent to take action and the 
protector will not give consent, or the protector has given the trustee 
directions that the trustee does not want to follow.  In those situations, 
the trustee should be free to seek judicial direction, much as a trustee 
could seek judicial construction of the trust instrument or judicial 
approval of a transaction in which the trustee has a personal interest.134  
The trustees are not directly seeking to compel action by the protector, 
but rather to obtain judicial approval for their own actions, which would 
 
 131 Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 87 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (“When 
the exercise of a discretionary power is left to the judgment of a trustee, an abuse of discretion 
may result from the trustee’s improper failure to exercise that judgment.”). 
 132 Cf. Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 104, at 455 (noting, in the corporate context, that 
liability for negligence could be highly disproportionate to the incentives for serving as a director, 
making it difficult to attract qualified candidates as outside directors). 
 133 Antony Duckworth has raised a doctrinal question about judicial enforcement of protector 
obligations.  He suggests that enforcement requires a recognized basis, such as contract or trust, 
and he finds difficulty with each in the context of protectors.  The protector may not have 
formally entered into a contract accepting the position, and the protector, unlike a trustee, does 
not hold any legal interest in the trust property.  Duckworth concedes, however, that one way or 
another, courts will find a basis for liability against protectors who breach fiduciary duties.  
Duckworth, supra note 12, at 254-55. 
 134 In a case arising in the Isle of Man, a court held that a trust should not fail for want of a 
protector, and when no successor protector could be appointed, a court could exercise the powers 
conferred on the trust protector.  Steele v. Paz Ltd., discussed in Waters, supra note 22, at 114-15.  
Presumably, the same principle would apply when the protector refuses to take action required by 
the trust instrument as when the office of the protector becomes vacant. 
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not otherwise be authorized under the terms of the trust instrument.135  
The situation is not materially different from one in which co-trustees 
disagree, and either has standing to seek judicial directions to avoid 
liability for breach resulting from the other’s preferred course of 
action.136 
When the protector’s behavior displeases the beneficiaries, but not 
the trustee, the beneficiaries have three alternatives: they can seek to 
compel the protector to take particular action, they can seek removal of 
the protector, or they can seek damages for the protector’s breach of 
fiduciary duty.  A beneficiary who seeks to compel the protector to act 
faces an uphill battle.  If the beneficiary wants the protector to intervene 
in a matter of trust administration, the problem is that the trust 
instrument typically—and sensibly—contemplates that the protector 
will defer to the trustee’s judgment on such matters, except in unusual 
circumstances.  If the protector chooses to defer to the trustee on an 
administrative matter, the beneficiaries should not be entitled to compel 
the protector to oppose the trustee unless the trustee’s action would 
itself be a clear breach of the trustee’s fiduciary duty.  If the instrument 
gives the protector power to direct distributions from the trust, a 
beneficiary is on firmer ground in seeking to compel the protector to 
act, but a court would nevertheless apply an “abuse of discretion” 
standard comparable to that applicable to the trustee of a discretionary 
trust.  The same standard ought to apply if a beneficiary were seeking to 
prevent the protector from authorizing distributions. 
Consider next the trust protector who has already engaged in 
misconduct.  The protector should be as subject to removal as other 
fiduciaries who have misconducted themselves, on a similar rationale: 
past is prologue.137  With trustees or executors, however, judicial 
removal is typically accompanied by appointment of a substitute 
fiduciary.138  From an agency cost perspective, however, it is less clear 
 
 135 Cf. Duckworth, supra note 12, at 255 (discussing Canadian and English cases in which the 
court itself gave directions to the trustee when the person with power to give the trustee 
investment directions became disabled, because of a conflict of interest, from giving those 
directions). 
 136 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 81 cmt. c. (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (“If a 
situation arises in which prudence requires that the trustees reach a decision and they are 
unwilling or unable to do so, the trustees have a duty to apply to an appropriate court for 
instructions.”). 
 137 See, e.g., Mahoney v. Mahoney, 370 N.E.2d 1011 (Mass. App. Ct. 1977) (refusing 
appointment of trustee because her use of trust assets for herself under a previous will 
undermined confidence in her ability to fairly administer the trust); Brault v. Bigham, 493 S.W.2d 
576 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (holding that an attempted appropriation of trust funds was an 
indication of future danger to the trust). 
 138 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-223 (2004); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-2.6 
(McKinney 2005) (authorizing appointment of successor trustee upon removal of trustee).  See 
generally 2 SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 28, § 108.2. 
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that removal of one protector should be followed by appointment of 
another.  The protector, unlike a trustee, is not essential for 
administration of the trust.  Moreover, as we have seen, appointment of 
the protector introduces agency costs that may or may not outweigh the 
benefits the protector generates in better monitoring of trustee behavior.  
Hence, appointment of a substitute protector should not be automatic.  
Instead, much should depend on the terms of the trust instrument.  
Suppose, for instance, that the settlor of the trust appointed a protector 
with whom the settlor had a close personal relationship, and included no 
provision for a substitute protector.  There is little reason to think such a 
settlor would want a court to appoint a substitute upon forfeiture of the 
office by the settlor’s chosen protector.  Conversely, if the trust 
instrument makes provision for successors, or makes it impossible for 
the trustee to perform its function without a protector (for instance, if 
the trust instrument provides that the trustee may not make new 
investments without the protector’s consent), then a court should 
appoint a substitute protector in deference to the settlor’s expressed 
intentions. 
 
E.     Effect of the Protector’s Action and Inaction on Trustee Liability 
 
In a world without trust protectors, potential liability for breach of 
fiduciary duty has served as a principal mechanism for deterring 
misbehavior by trustees.  Once a settlor introduces a trust protector into 
the picture, should the protector’s presence affect the potential liability 
of the trustee?  That is, to what extent should protector monitoring serve 
as a substitute for, rather than merely a supplement to, trustee liability 
for breach of fiduciary duty? 
The trustee’s argument in these cases would be that the protector, 
by action or inaction, implicitly authorized the trustee’s behavior, and 
that the protector’s authorization immunized the trustee from liability 
for breach of fiduciary duty. 
 
1.     Powers Not Held by the Protector in a Fiduciary Capacity 
 
As we have seen, the trust instrument might explicitly provide that 
a trust protector owes no fiduciary duties to trust beneficiaries, or 
context might make it clear that the protector can act out of personal 
self-interest.  In those circumstances, if the protector acts within the 
power granted by the trust instrument, and directs the trustee to make 
particular investments, or withholds consent from decisions the trustee 
  
2800 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 27:6 
 
believes prudent, the trustee who follows the protector’s directions, or 
who abstains from taking actions to which the protector refuses to 
consent, should not be liable to the beneficiaries for breach of fiduciary 
duty.  In these limited circumstances, the clear intent of the settlor to 
insulate the trustee from liability should prevail; when the trust 
instrument implicitly or explicitly authorizes the protector to act in self-
interest, the trustee has no power to veto decisions made by the 
protector even if those decisions are not in the interest of the other trust 
beneficiaries.139 
We now turn to the more common situation in which the protector 
does owe duties to the trust beneficiaries. 
 
2.     Inaction by the Protector 
 
In a regime where protector deference to the trustee’s decisions 
should be the norm, the trustee should not be in a position to seek 
shelter from the protector’s inaction.  The protector’s failure to 
intervene in administration of the trust need not signal approval of the 
trustee’s action, but might instead represent a reluctance to interfere 
with the trustee’s exercise of discretion conferred by the settlor. 
Moreover, in those cases where the trust instrument prevents the 
trustee from acting without the consent or direction of the protector, and 
the protector withholds that consent or direction, the trustee may not use 
the protector’s inaction as a shield for the trustee’s own inaction when 
the trustee knew or should have known that the protector’s inaction 
could harm the trust or breach a duty owed by the protector.140  In that 
situation, the trustee’s obligation is to seek judicial directions.141 
 
3.     Protector Ratification of the Trustee’s Action 
 
Similarly, when the trust instrument requires that the protector 
consent to particular actions proposed by the trustee, the protector’s 
 
 139 A number of cases involving a beneficiary or settlor with power to direct or consent to trust 
investments have reached the same conclusion.  See, e.g., Ditmars v. Camden Trust Co., 76 A.2d 
280 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1950) (holding that the trustee was insulated from liability by life 
tenant’s refusal to consent when the instrument gave the life tenant power of approval for sale of 
securities); Reeve v. Chase Nat’l Bank, 287 N.Y.S. 937 (N.Y. App. Div. 1936) (holding that the 
settlor’s direction to purchase bonds insulated the trustee from liability when settlor reserved 
complete control over trust investments); In re Jacobs’ Trust Estate, 183 A. 49 (Pa. 1936) (same). 
 140 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 75 cmt. g (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (“Where 
the terms of the trust do not allow the trustee to act without the consent of another, the trustee is 
not necessarily justified in doing nothing merely because the consent has not been received.”). 
 141 Id. 
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ratification should not generally insulate the trustee from liability for 
breach of fiduciary duty.  Insulating the trustee from liability permits 
the trustee to shift responsibility for decisions to the protector, and 
reduces the incentive for the trustee to exercise care: if the protector 
ratifies the trustee’s action, the trustee would escape liability; if the 
protector does not ratify, the trustee cannot take the action, and 
therefore cannot incur liability.  Moreover, even if the protector has the 
power to remove the trustee, that removal power would provide an 
incentive for the trustee to do the protector’s bidding, not to act as an 
independent safeguard of the interests of the trust beneficiaries. 
The position of the trustee whose action receives approval from the 
trust protector resembles the position of a trustee whose action is 
endorsed by a co-trustee.  Endorsement or approval by the co-trustee 
does not relieve the trustee who proposes an action from liability for 
breach of fiduciary duty.142  The rationale for that rule applies with 
equal force to the trustee who needs and obtains consent from a 
protector: when the settlor reposed power in multiple fiduciaries, the 
settlor expected each independently to act with prudence and loyalty 
toward the trust beneficiaries.143 
The situation is different when the settlor has named a trust 
protector with the express purpose of insulating the trustee from liability 
from particular claims of breach of fiduciary duty—particularly claims 
of self-dealing by the trustee.  The no-further-inquiry rule typically 
requires a trustee to seek court approval for any transaction between the 
trustee and the trust, however advantageous that transaction might be 
for the trust.144  A settlor might name a trust protector, with power to 
 
 142 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 81(2) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (providing 
that each trustee “has a duty to use reasonable care to prevent a co-trustee from committing a 
breach of trust . . . .”); see also UNIF. TRUST CODE § 703(e) (2005) (“A trustee may not delegate 
to a cotrustee the performance of a function the settlor reasonably expected the trustees to 
perform jointly.”); 2A SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 28, § 184 (4th ed. 2001). 
 143 See generally UNIF. TRUST CODE § 703 cmt. (“Cotrustees are appointed for a variety of 
reasons.”).  Having multiple decision-makers serves as a safeguard against eccentricity or 
misconduct.  By contrast, when a trustee receives approval for a proposed action from all of the 
trust’s beneficiaries, as opposed to a co-trustee or trust protector, that approval does generally 
insulate the trustee from liability for the action, so long as the trustee has provided the 
beneficiaries with complete information.  See, e.g., Meier v. Union Trust Co. of Indianapolis, 176 
N.E. 42 (Ind. Ct. App. 1931); Mann v. Day, 165 N.W. 643 (Mich. 1917); Turner v. Fryberger, 
109 N.W. 229 (Minn. 1906).  In that situation, however, there is no potential for explicit or 
implicit collusion between the parties to limit the rights of trust beneficiaries; the beneficiaries 
themselves have consented to the arrangement.  Moreover, estoppel principles would generally 
preclude beneficiaries from challenging actions they themselves have approved. 
 144 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) 
(“[U]nder the so-called ‘no further inquiry’ principle it is immaterial that the trustee may be able 
to show that the action in question was taken in good faith, that the terms of the transaction were 
fair, and that no profit resulted to the trustee.”).  For discussion of the continued vitality of the no 
further inquiry rule, compare Langbein, supra note 5, with Melanie B. Leslie, In Defense of the 
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approve self-dealing by the trustee, precisely to avoid the costs 
associated with judicial approval.  In that situation, protector’s approval 
should insulate the trustee from liability. 
 
4.     Protector Directs Action by the Trustee 
 
The most difficult problems arise when the trustee follows 
directions given by the trust protector.  Ordinarily, when the trust 
instrument confers on the protector authority to direct the trustee to 
make particular investments or distributions, the trustee is obligated to 
follow directions issued by the protector in the exercise of that 
authority.145  Sometimes, however, the protector’s directions may 
breach the protector’s fiduciary duty, even if the directions are not 
inconsistent with the express language of the trust instrument.146 
As a practical matter, the trustee faced with directions of 
questionable validity has several choices.  The trustee can follow the 
protector’s directions.147  The trustee can seek judicial approval of a 
decision to follow the protector’s directions.148  The trustee can seek 
approval from the trust beneficiaries.  If the trustee obtains judicial 
approval or approval from the trust beneficiaries, the trustee has 
effectively insulated itself from liability for breach of fiduciary duty.  
But what if, instead, the trustee follows the protector’s directions? 
If the trust beneficiaries were optimal monitors of the actions of 
trust protectors, there would be little reason to hold the trustee liable for 
following the protector’s directions, even when those directions 
breached the protector’s fiduciary duty.  Because the beneficiaries can 
hold the protector accountable through an action for breach of fiduciary 
duty, the protector would have ex ante incentives to act appropriately, 
 
No Further Inquiry Rule: A Response to Professor John Langbein, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 541 
(2005). 
 145 As the Restatement points out: 
Where the terms of the trust provide that, in administering the trust, the trustee shall 
take certain actions if so directed by another person, it is ordinarily the trustee’s duty to 
comply with that person’s direction; the trustee would ordinarily be liable for a loss 
resulting from failure to do so. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 75 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005). 
 146 See generally Bove, supra note 27, at 390, 392. 
 147 The trustee can first question the protector, which might, in some circumstances, cause the 
protector to reconsider.  If, however, the protector does not reconsider, the trustee is left with the 
same alternatives. 
 148 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 75 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (stating that 
if the power holder insists upon compliance with the power holder’s directions despite the 
trustee’s objection, the trustee may apply to the court for instructions); cf. In re Rogers, 63 O.L.R. 
180 (1929) (discussed in Waters, supra note 22, at 75). 
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while the beneficiaries would receive compensation ex post when the 
protector does not act appropriately. 
But a primary reason for introducing protectors into the world of 
domestic trusts is that beneficiaries are often inadequate monitors of 
their own interests.  The trustee, on the other hand, has typically been 
appointed to protect the interests of the trust beneficiaries.  Holding the 
trustee liable for failing to seek judicial or beneficiary consent before 
acceding to the protector’s questionable directions provides the trustee 
with an incentive to monitor the protector’s actions.149  In most cases, 
this incentive will result in discussions between the protector and the 
trustee, resulting in a resolution that incorporates the judgments of both 
protector and trustee.150 
The difficult problem is determining when the cost to the trustee of 
monitoring the protector’s behavior exceeds the value of that 
monitoring.151  In general, the cost to the trustee of monitoring the 
prudence of the protector’s investment directions is likely to be low.  As 
a result, if a protector directs the trustee to follow investment practices 
not explicitly authorized by settlor and seriously at odds with modern 
portfolio theory, the trustee should not be entitled to follow the 
protector’s directions without risk of liability.152  By contrast, the cost to 
the trustee of determining whether protector has engaged in self-dealing 
is likely to be higher.153  The trustee has little reason to know enough 
about the protector’s personal financial affairs to determine whether the 
protector’s decisions generate personal benefit for the protector.154  
 
 149 For authorities suggesting that the trustee should be liable in this instance, see In re Cross, 
175 A. 212, 214 (N.J. Eq. 1934), rev’d on other grounds, 176 A. 101 (N.J. 1935); Note, Trust 
Advisors, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1230, 1233 (1965); SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 28, at 574-75; 
Waters, supra note 22, at 85-86. 
 150 Alternatively, if the protector persists in directing an action that the trustee believes 
constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty, the trustee would be forced to seek judicial instructions.  
See generally Trust Advisors, supra note 149, at 1233. 
 151 The Restatement of Trusts attempts to capture this problem by providing that if the holder 
of a power to direct the trustee violates a fiduciary duty in exercising the power, “the trustee is not 
liable for acting in accordance with the exercise of the power unless the trustee knows or should 
have known that the power holder acted in violation of the fiduciary duty.”  RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 75 cmt. e (Tentative Draft, No. 4, 2005). 
 152 For a case holding a professional co-executor subject to liability for losses that resulted 
when co-executor, testator’s brother, refused to consent to a sale of stock, and the will required 
brother’s consent to any sale, see In re Cross, 172 A. 212 (N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1934), rev’d on other 
grounds, 176 A. 101 (N.J. 1935).  The court wrote that the testator’s direction that stock not be 
sold without the brother’s consent “ceased to be a shield when the estate became endangered by 
his conduct.”  Id. at 215.  The decision was reversed on the ground that the brother’s actions were 
not negligent. 
 153 In many instances, the protector may be the only source of information about his own self-
dealing, he may be unlikely to disclose that self-dealing.  Cf. Eisenberg, supra note 80, at 453. 
 154 Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 75 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005): 
[W]here the terms of the trust provide that the trustee shall make such investments as a 
designated person may direct, and the person directs a trustee to purchase certain 
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Moreover, generating that information about a transaction that, on its 
face, appears to be in the interests of the trust beneficiaries would 
typically cost more than the information is worth to those beneficiaries.  
Hence, the trustee should not typically bear liability for failing to detect 
self-dealing by a protector in a transaction that appeared to be fair and 
prudent for the beneficiaries.155 
 
F.     The Effect of the Trust Instrument: Default or Mandatory Rules? 
 
The preceding sections have demonstrated that the typical settlor 
concerned about agency costs should want to impose fiduciary duties on 
trust protectors, and should not want to exculpate them from liability.  
The remaining question is whether the liability regime sketched out in 
previous sections should be treated as a default regime or as one with 
mandatory elements. 
For a variety of reasons, the case for mandatory rules is a weak 
one.156  First, the variation in reasons for appointing protectors, and 
hence, the capacities and weaknesses of protectors appointed, vary too 
significantly to impose on trust settlors a one-size-fits-all regime for 
governance of trust protectors.  Second, the newness of the protector 
concept suggests that experimentation rather than fiat is more likely to 
lead to efficient regulatory structures.  Third, at this juncture, protectors 
as a class have little market power and no stranglehold on information, 
making it unlikely that they could dupe settlors or their lawyers into 
including protector provisions unfavorable to the trust beneficiaries.  
Hence, one would expect courts to demonstrate considerable respect for 
alternative governance schemes developed by settlors and their 
lawyers—especially when those schemes are narrowly tailored to 
address identified potential conflicts. 
Nevertheless, some cautions are in order.  First, it will be difficult 
for settlors and their lawyers to determine in advance the sorts of 
imprudent or self-interested behavior in which protectors might engage.  
Broad exculpatory clauses might reflect imperfections of foresight 
 
securities, the trustee is not liable for doing so merely because it is later shown that the 
designated person had a personal interest in having the trust purchase the securities, 
provided the trustee neither knew nor had reason to believe that (and thus a duty to 
investigate whether) this conflict of interests existed. 
Id. 
 155 Cf. Duckworth, supra note 12, at 254 (trustee should be excused if trustee acted “honestly 
and reasonably and ought fairly to be excused”). 
 156 But see Duckworth, supra note 12, at 176 (discussing limits on powers the protector might 
have). 
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rather than clarity of purpose.157  Trust settlors will rarely intend to give 
protectors the equivalent of fee ownership of the trust assets (at least 
when the protector is not a very close relative).158 But the combination 
of broad powers together with a broad exculpatory clause can give the 
protector very close to absolute rights in the trust property.  Hence, for 
the same reasons courts have been unwilling to construe trust 
instruments to exculpate trustees from all breaches of fiduciary duty, 
courts should properly be skeptical of overbroad provisions purporting 
to exculpate trust protectors—particularly when the protector’s conduct 
has been egregious.159 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The relationship between the trust’s settlor and a trust protector is 
founded primarily on trust; the settlor trusts the protector to act as a 
faithful agent.  In this respect, the relationship resembles that between 
fourteenth century landowners and their feoffees—precursors to the 
modern trustee who agreed to do the bidding of their principals by 
holding, and transferring, legal title in accordance with instructions 
given to them by those principals.160  Initially, the feoffee’s obligations 
were entirely moral; his duties were not enforceable at all.161  But the 
history of the early trust suggests that the relationship between the 
protector and the settlor, like the relationship between landowner and 
feoffee, will not long escape the scrutiny of the legal system; trust alone 
has proven inadequate to ensure that trustees act as faithful agents.162  
Fiduciary duties have emerged to play a significant, albeit 
supplementary, role. 
Fiduciary duties are likely to play a similar role in disciplining trust 
protectors.  But protectors are not simply trustees by another name.  The 
settlor who names a protector chooses to forego more traditional 
arrangements for shared responsibility for trust decisions, presumably 
out of a belief that the protector model adds value that traditional 
arrangements cannot capture.  That added value is most likely to come 
in two forms: reduced agency costs in monitoring trustee behavior, and 
increased ability to adapt the trust to changed circumstances.  But the 
agency costs associated with policing the protector threaten to dissipate 
 
 157 See Leslie, supra note 3, at 103. 
 158 See Duckworth, supra note 12, at 178. 
 159 Cf. Waters, supra note 22, at 85, 98-100. 
 160 See generally 1 SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 28, § 1.3. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. § 1.4. 
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this added value.  If the protector is to survive as a trust institution, it 
will do so because the fiduciary duty regime that surrounds protectors 
minimizes those agency costs while maintaining the advantages 
associated with protectors. 
At this point in the development of the trust protector, any attempt 
to describe a fiduciary duty regime that minimizes agency costs is 
necessarily tentative and incomplete.  My objective here has been to 
provide a framework for developing that regime. 
 
